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HISTORICAL OUTLINE
OF
THE GREEK REVOLUTION.

&c. &c.

AKADHMIA

ΑΘΗΝΑΙ

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AN
HISTORICAL OUTLINE
OF THE
GREEK REVOLUTION,

WITH
A FEW REMARKS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF
AFFAIRS IN THAT COUNTRY.

BY

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LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MDCCCXXVI.

AN

HISTORICAL OUTLINE

OF THE


AMERICAN REVOLUTION



AKADHMIA

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION.



THE following Memoir has been written at three different periods, as the dates will show. The first part having been prepared for a periodical work, and published anonymously with scarcely any alteration, is often expressed in a tone somewhat different from that which the author would have been inclined to employ under his own name. The work is chiefly addressed to the military reader, who may be asked after perusing it, whether—considering on one side the character of the insurgents and the strength of their country, on the other the imbecillity of the enemy and the difficulties of his military combinations—he thinks it possible that the Porte can ever suppress the Greek insurrection without foreign assistance. But this foreign assistance is not wanting.

accompanied a new edition of the "Jeune Anacharsis" of Barthelemy; but many corrections have been made in the details of that delineation, and the names have been inserted solely with a view to illustrate the present publication.

LONDON, *January*, 1825.



HISTORICAL OUTLINE,

&c. &c.

THERE is no nation, as far as history has left us the means of judging, that has so little changed in a long course of ages as the Greeks. It may be sufficient, without adverting to the less certain indications of manners or physical aspect, to remark, that the Greeks still employ the same character in writing which was used in the remotest age of their history; that their language has received only such corruptions as cannot fail, for the greater part, to fall into disuse, as literary education and a familiarity with their ancient writers shall be diffused among them; that a great number of places in Greece, as well as of the productions of nature, are known by the same names which were attached to them in the most

ancient times; and that this language and this people still occupy the same country, which was always peculiarly considered among them as Hellas, or Greece properly so called, namely, the south-eastern extremity of Europe from the Tænarian promontory to upper Macedonia, together with the islands and coasts of the Ægæan sea.

Nor are their eastern neighbours much altered, when we consider the state of Asia in comparison with that great change which civilization has effected in the human species, and on the surface of the earth throughout the greater part of Europe. The countries of western Asia are undoubtedly, like Greece itself, less populous, less opulent, and more barbarous than they were twenty or thirty centuries ago; but we find that, notwithstanding the vicissitudes which have occurred among the Asiatic nations themselves, the Persian of the present day closely resembles, both in features and dress, his ancestor, as represented on the walls of Persepolis; and that, although the predominant power in western Asia has passed into the hands of a different race of Asiatics, the strongest general affinity still prevails between the ancient and the modern inhabitants in cha-

racter, in manners, and in customs, both civil and military.

The present contest between the Turks and their late subjects in Greece is probably the beginning of a new change in that preponderancy which has been alternating between south-eastern Europe and western Asia, since the earliest records of history.

By the successful resistance of the Greeks to the great Oriental invasion of that country under Darius and Xerxes, the invaded people raised themselves to as high a degree of glory, civilization, and intellectual enjoyment as it is possible, perhaps, for a nation to attain, deprived as they were of revealed religion, and of all the modern improvements in science. By their superiority in the art of war they were soon enabled not only to attack their former invaders, but to carry their victorious arms into the heart of Asia. From this height, they gradually and inevitably declined, as the sun declines from the meridian, until, having first lost their own military spirit and skill and then the martial discipline which they learnt in the service of their Roman conquerors, they became unable to contend with the ferocious valour of the people of Asia inspired by

religious zeal and guided by the energy of the early Ottoman sultans, and at length fell under the attacks of the Asiatic barbarians, nineteen centuries after the former invasion. The situation in which the two people have been placed for the last 400 years has now produced a new revolution. While luxuries, chiefly borrowed from the conquered people, added to the effects of a general decline of Musulman enthusiasm, have led to the degeneracy of the Asiatic masters of Greece, their subjects have been so much improved by adversity, and by the light transmitted from Christendom, that the Oriental invaders are once more threatened with expulsion from Europe.

It is but a very few years since the Greeks had no higher views than the hope of witnessing the downfall of their oppressors, and of obtaining an easier yoke under the conqueror, often applying to themselves the humble language of the vine to the goat, in the elegant epigram of Evenus:—

Κῆν με φάγῃς ἐπὶ ρίζαν, ὅμως ἔτι καρποφορήσω
 "Ὅσον ἐπισπείσαι, σοι, τράγε, θυομένῳ.

But they now seem to think of sacrificing the goat themselves.

While their mountaineers and seamen are asserting the cause of independence in arms, many a lettered Greek is undoubtedly engaged in noticing occurrences as they come under his immediate observation. Until these memoirs, together with those of a few European eye-witnesses, shall be collected, we can hardly hope to obtain correct particulars of a series of events, which are not less interesting from their scene of action, than from their singularity, compared with the common course of modern history: for as to those mixed compilations of truth and error called Histories or Memoirs of the Revolution, which have been published in several of the capitals of Europe, it is in vain that the reader attempts to extract from them any clear and connected description of the contest. Their obscurity is not a little heightened by the defectiveness and inaccuracy of the existing maps of Greece; as well as by the want of that authentic guidance to the truth which in civilized Europe is afforded by the official reports of military transactions, but which it is contrary to the custom of one of the contending parties to publish, and the other has not yet been in a state of government to attend to. And thus the inquirer, however diligent, is exposed, almost without re-

source, to that torrent of exaggeration or mistatement, which, without any systematic intention of deceiving on the part of those really engaged in the war, is conveyed to this extremity of Europe from Turkey, the Ionian islands, Italy or Austria; and which, after receiving, perhaps, some further colouring in Paris, or in London itself, is poured forth in an unceasing stream from the daily press.

In the following pages, it is intended to give a brief statement of the origin and progress of the insurrection, and of the principal transactions of the war, to the latest period of which we have intelligence. No attempt will be made to enter into such minute details as cannot yet be obtained with accuracy. The author is acquainted with the scene of action, and with the customs of the two contending parties; and, although he has not been in any part of Greece since the contest began, he has had opportunities of collecting the facts from authentic sources.

As the causes of such an event as the present insurrection in Greece cannot thoroughly be understood without a reference to the previous condition of those who are engaged in it, it will be necessary to detain the reader with a few observations on this subject. It is remarkable that

travellers who visit Greece generally return from thence with an unfavourable opinion of the people. But it is not difficult to account for this. From a real or supposed want of time, or in consequence of the disgust and impatience usually produced by the privations and inconveniences of a semi-barbarous state of society, travellers are generally contented to follow the beaten route of Athens, the Islands, the Asiatic coast, Troy, and Constantinople; their journey is concluded before they have acquired a sufficient knowledge of the language to form any impartial estimate of the national character; and they come chiefly into contact with those classes upon which the long subjection of the nation to the Turks has had the greatest effect, such as persons in authority under the government or otherwise in Turkish employ, servants, interpreters, the lower order of traders; and generally the inhabitants of those towns and districts in which the Turkish population has a great preponderance of numbers.

It is obviously not in these situations, but in the more unfrequented islands and on the continent of European Greece, where the Turks do not form a tenth part of the population, that the inquiry ought to be made whether any of the

ancient talents and virtues of the Greeks have survived the four centuries of Musulman oppression, which supervened upon the debasement caused by Byzantine despotism, weakness, and superstition. In such an inquiry, it would be further necessary to distinguish between the inhabitants of the plains and those of the mountains; for these two classes have been placed in very different circumstances ever since the establishment of the Ottoman power in Greece.

As the chief strength of an Asiatic army consists in its cavalry, it was to the skill of the Osmanlys in the management of the horse and the sabre, added to religious enthusiasm; to the confidence inspired by former success and to their general superiority in courage and enterprize over the degenerate Greeks, that they owed the conquest of the Eastern empire of Rome. But the horse and the sabre are very imperfect instruments for the subjugation of mountainous districts; and after the first incursions of the Turks the mountaineers of Greece were not long in deriving new means of defence from the increasing use of fire-arms among them.

The consequence has been that the mountains of Greece have never been completely subdued

by the Ottomans, and that, while the Christian inhabitants of the plains either retired before them, or became mere cultivators for the conquerors, who assumed possession of the lands by a grant from the sultan upon the feudal tenure of military service, the inhabitants of the mountains have retained possession of the soil, and, having been joined by many of the Christians of the plains, are still nearly as numerous as under the Byzantine empire. Meanwhile, depopulation, the effect of lawless oppression and of frequent visitations of the plague, has produced in many of the most fertile parts of Greece desolation and consequent unhealthiness of air, which would have been still more extensive had not a part of the vacancy been filled up at different times since the Turkish conquest by Christian migrations from Albania and Bulgaria, where local wars, Musulman persecution, or superabundant numbers in a very poor soil had occasionally caused distress greater even than that which had driven the Greeks from their native lands.

About two centuries ago, a large colony of Christian Albanians settled in Bœotia, Attica, and Argolis, where their descendants still speak the

Albanian tongue: a small tribe of them, which passed over into the barren island of Hydreá, founded the community which has since been so conspicuous for its commercial enterprize and opulence.

Of the people of Greece Proper who have been driven from their native land by the effects of Turkish oppression, many have migrated during the last half century to Asia Minor, attracted by the mild government of the Turkish family of Kara Osmàn Oglu, under whom numerous Greek towns enlivened the vallies of the Hermus and Caicus, and had almost restored that country to the fertility which it enjoyed under the Pergamenian kings.

The nominal conditions upon which the Christian peasant of European Turkey labours for the Turkish proprietor are not oppressive: they were adopted by the Ottomans, among many other established usages of the country, and the practice is similar to that which is still very common in all the poorer countries of Europe. After the deduction of about a seventh for the imperial land-tax, the landlord receives half the remainder, or a larger share, according to the proportion of the

seed, stock, and instruments of husbandry, which he may have supplied.*

Nor is the capitation-tax, which the Sultan exacts from every rayah, or non-conforming subject, severe in itself, however vexatious it often proves in the collecting; as it very seldom amounts to so much as two pounds sterling per annum for an entire family.

The Turks, however, by obliging the Christian peasants to dispose of the fruits of their labour for the use of Constantinople, or of the local government, at a price fixed by the purchaser,—by occasional levies of contributions in money or kind, by the quartering of soldiers, by *Angária*,† or the exaction of gratuitous labour for works called public, and by various other modes of oppression, reduce the profits of the Christian labourer to such a pittance, as hardly leaves him an existence.

Such has been the general condition of the

* This mode of farming, like so many other customs in Greece, has prevailed from the earliest ages. The *μεγριάγωγος* was known by the name of *μορτίριος* in the time of Solon (Jul. Pol. 7. c. 32.) He is the *partarius* or *medietarius* of the Latins, from which last word comes the French *métayer*, *métairie*.

† This word, with its present meaning, is found in Menander, (ap. Suid.) Both the custom and the word were imported into Greece from Persia.

peasantry in the plains of Macedonia, Bœotia and Thessaly, in Eubœa, and in all those parts of the country in which the Turks were most numerous. In the Moréa and other parts of Greece to the southward of Mount Ceta, where the level country is more intersected by mountains, and where conquest was less complete, the Turks were less anxious to establish themselves as feudatories, the convents retained a portion of their landed property, and some parts even of the vallies have remained in the hands of the Greeks either as proprietors or as tenants of the Turkish Emperors, who set apart some of the best districts of this part of Greece as imperial domains, or for the support of the imperial harem, or of the imperial mosques, or of the female relations of the Sultans. In these situations the Christians continued to hold a large portion of the lands on easy conditions; and having greater facility than elsewhere in making their complaints heard at court, they enjoyed some protection from oppressive governors. In all the islands of the Ægæan, except in some portion of the Asiatic islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Lesbos, the Greeks have always remained in possession of the lands, subject only to the land-tax and capitation.

In general, the condition of the peasant under

the Greek proprietor was not much better than under the Turks themselves. It was the inevitable effect of the Turkish system to prompt the Greek, who had acquired power either by property or by office, to exercise it in the oppression of his inferiors. Like the Turk, the Greek landed proprietor often took advantage of distresses which he had himself created, to lend the peasant money at an exorbitant interest, and by paying himself with the fruits of the labourer's industry at a low valuation, thus reduced him to a condition little better than that of a slave. In the Peloponnesus especially the *Proesti*, or *Magistrates*, who were placed in authority over districts where there were no Turkish inhabitants, or those who farmed the collection of the taxes from the Turks, were hardly to be distinguished from them in manners or in their cruel conduct towards the peasantry. The most powerful were often in league with the Pasha to plunder the Christians, and sometimes were so allied with him in interest, as to contribute, by opportune petitions from the Peninsula, backed by those arguments of the purse, without which nothing is effected at Constantinople, to obtain for him the renewal of the Pashalik for an additional year or two. These persons, being inte-

rested in the continuance of ignorance and Turkish tyranny, were, together with some of the higher clergy, the greatest obstacles to national improvement; for the latter class having generally procured their ecclesiastical dignities at a considerable expense, were (except in the greater permanence of their offices) placed in a situation very similar to that of the Turkish governors of provinces and districts, whose object it necessarily was to exact from the governed as much as they possibly could, during their transitory authority.

The want of hands in the plains of Greece attracted great numbers of labourers, during the harvest, vintage, and olive crop, from the islands of the Ægæan and Ionian seas, who returned home at the end of the season with the produce of their well-paid labour; for the *ήμεροκάματον*, or hire of daily labour, is high in Greece, and on the occasions just mentioned is of course higher than usual.

In every part of Greece the peasant's family derives some resource from the spinning of cotton and wool, and from the weaving of the coarse stuffs which serve for the greater part of their dress and furniture; and though his condition upon the whole is miserable, he is in general in-

dustrious, much attached to his family, anxious for the education of his children, and equal, if not superior, in intelligence to the peasantry of the most civilized countries of Europe.

That this last distinguished characteristic of the ancient Greeks is retained by their descendants of every condition has in general been allowed even by those who have received the most unfavourable impressions of the nation. Among the most ignorant and uncultivated, and even in the parts of Greece where the Turkish system was most oppressive, the observing traveller could not fail to remark that curiosity, ingenuity, keenness, and elocution, for which the ancient people was remarkable; and the natural effect of which upon the present race was an extreme impatience of their unhappy condition. Not a traveller from civilized Europe could pass without exciting the hope that some interference in their favour was in contemplation, and he never failed to hear from them many bitter reproaches against us for allowing our fellow-Christians to remain enslaved under the yoke of infidels.

The greater part of the peasantry in the plains of Northern Greece, and in the neighbourhood of the great Turkish towns, were unarmed; but

in the more mountainous parts of the country, and generally in every part of the Moréa, there was scarcely a house that did not, unless prevented by mere poverty, possess a musket or pistols, or some kind of weapon of defence. It was a constant practice among the provincial governors of Greece in all cases of an alarm of war with any of the Christian powers, to secure hostages from the principal families, at the same time that a general decree of the Porte was issued for disarming the Christian subjects. But in Greece, to which such an edict was always especially directed, its execution was little more than nominal: for the Turks, being in general afraid of venturing into the mountainous parts of the country, or aware of the ease with which the Greeks could secrete their arms for the moment, were always ready to accept of a small pecuniary compromise; and thus the Sultan's commands for disarming the Christians, like many other of his decrees relating to them, ended, at the utmost, in a contribution to the provincial government.

The most remarkable contrast to the inhabitants of the plains of Greece is to be found in those islands of the Ægæan sea where there are no Turkish inhabitants, and in the mountainous

parts of Crete, of Laconia, Arcadia, Ætolia, Locris, Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia. Here the Greeks bear the most striking resemblance, both in their virtues and defects, to their illustrious ancestors, as we find them depicted in ancient history—industrious, hardy, enterprising, heroic, ardently attached to their homes and native country, living upon little or lovers of wine and gaiety as the occasion prompts—sanguine, quick, ingenious, imitative; but vain, inconstant, envious, treacherous and turbulent. In some of the more mountainous parts of Greece, villages and even whole districts were left to their own management, or rather to that of acknowledged primates, who were responsible for the payment of the ordinary contributions, and who generally farmed those taxes from the Turkish government. In some parts of the mountains, not even the kharadj, or capitation, was regularly paid. In all these places, the principal heads of families had some share in the government, and the executive power was generally in the hands of those who had the greatest riches or most extensive connections. As usually occurs in this form of society, the neighbouring villages, or the leading families in a village, were often engaged in quarrels, which had

the important effect of enuring them to the use of arms.

Such also has been the general condition of the greater part of Albania, both Musulman and Christian; for although a few great chieftains, confirmed by the authority of the Porte, have from time to time established a more despotic authority around some of the principal towns in Albania, they have never been sufficiently uncontrolled to avoid the necessity of conforming to the petty interests, disputes, and alliances incidental to such a state of society. Even Aly Pasha, who had latterly reduced a large portion of Albania to obedience, and had acquired influence in every part of it, was not exempt from the necessity of often deferring to the national habits of independent anarchy, and as frequently obtained his ends by artifice as by the open display of power.

In the highlands of Greece and Albania, a great part of the male population is engaged in the care of sheep and cattle, changing their pasture-ground according to the season of the year. Others are owners and conductors of the numerous horses and mules, which, in a country where there are no carriage-roads, are necessary for the transport of commodities of every kind; and a large portion of

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and ultimately to reside in their native mountains, where they enjoyed as great a degree of security, as any part of the Turkish dominions afforded, until Aly Pasha found means to introduce his Albanian soldiers among them: for Aly, though anxious to transmit his acquired authority to his family, never thought of obtaining this object by protecting the property of his subjects, or by rendering them interested in the permanence of his power, and could never divest himself of that avidity for immediate gain, which is the sole guide of every Turk in office. While continually augmenting his personal landed property at the expense of both Turks and Greeks in Epirus, Acarnania, and Western Thessaly, he was equally eager to plunder of their savings the industrious artisans and traders of every part of Northern Greece; and as this conduct forced them to emigrate, whenever they could escape his vigilance, (for he always endeavoured to prevent them by force,) the extension of his power had the effect of dispeopling many towns in Northern Greece, and of depriving that country of many of its best inhabitants. It is probable that in the latter years of Aly's reign, the population of continental Greece, from Cape Tænarum to the northern-most limits, at which the

Greek language is in common use, was not much greater than a million.

The change which has taken place in the political condition of the Greeks since the Turkish conquest, has principally arisen from two causes, both of which have been progressive, ever since that event. The one is the increase of knowledge, communicated to the Christians from civilized Europe, while the Turks have been in a stationary or declining state; the other is the apostacy of Albania, or the conversion of a great part of its population from Christianity to the Islam. While the former effected such a gradual improvement of a moral and mental kind, as had a direct tendency to rouse the natives of Greece to throw off the yoke, the latter, being more rapid in its progress, has operated with still more efficacy to prevent such a result.

Next to the preservation of their religion, the modern Greeks have been indebted for returning civilization to their foreign commerce. That which they possessed at the time of the Turkish conquest was not entirely lost after that event, because the conquerors, unskilful in any thing but arms, and despising trade, left the pursuit of it to their Christian subjects. While that of Asia chiefly

fell into the hands of the Armenians, the Greeks, from their position, naturally retained the greater part of the commerce of European Turkey ; and hence they came into immediate contact with the increasing improvement of Christian Europe. Numerous families, escaping from Turkish oppression, emigrated into the adjacent countries, and by degrees Greek commercial houses were established in the maritime towns of Europe, or in the interior of Russia and Germany, and they have even spread as far as India.

The communication being constant between the emigrant Greeks of Europe, and those who remained under the Turkish yoke, great efforts were made by the former to meliorate the mental condition of their brethren in Greece : they were warmly seconded by the more enlightened or opulent Greeks of Turkey : many Greeks were educated in Europe, and education gradually spread over Greece, by the establishment or enlargement of schools and colleges.

Even of late years, during which the trade and industry of Northern Greece suffered so much injury from the oppressive government of Aly Pasha, the increase of education among the Greeks has not been proportionably checked, as

Aly found some immediate advantage in favouring education among his Christian subjects; while the Greeks who were driven to settle in the neighbouring parts of civilized Europe, still continued to promote the improvement of their fellow-countrymen, who remained under the yoke.

Notwithstanding the superiority which the Frank merchant enjoyed over the Greek, in paying a single ad valorem duty, of three per cent. on imports and exports, while the rayah, besides being subject to illegal extortions, paid five per cent. in addition to repeated charges on moving his merchandize, the advantage which a native merchant always possesses in economy and local information, had gradually enabled the Greeks to drive the Frank merchants from the fairs of Greece, to obtain a great part of the internal maritime commerce of Turkey, and at length to share very largely in the exchange of the corn, oil, cotton, silk, and other produce of Greece for the manufactured goods and colonial produce of the European nations.

In the latter part of the last century, the foreign commerce of the Greeks had so much increased, that their competition was the principal cause of the decline of the European factories which had

long flourished in the principal Turkish marts: that competition having been greatly favoured, against the interests of the Frank merchants, by their own diplomatic agents, who largely exercised the privilege of granting protections to the Christian subjects of Turkey, in virtue of which they enjoyed the same commercial privileges as the merchants of the protecting state.

The French revolution had a further effect in promoting the commerce of the Greeks, and with it the extension of education and knowledge throughout the nation, by placing in their hands the greater part of the carrying trade of the Black Sea and Mediterranean, which had formerly been enjoyed by the South of France and the Adriatic.

For several years before the present insurrection broke out, there were between four and five hundred Greek ships employed in the commerce of the Black Sea; at the same time that colleges with professorships in various branches of instruction were established at *Kydoniés*, Smyrna, Chios, *Ioannina*, besides the smaller establishments at Patmos, Thessalonica, *Ambelákia*, *Zagorú* (in Pelion), Athens, *Dimitzána* (in Arcadia), some of which, although of old date, had been renewed or increased of late years. It is not surprising,

under these circumstances, that the mental improvement of the Greeks, and the superiority which it gave them over their unimproveable masters, had rendered the latter more and more dependent upon them in the transaction of business of every kind.

And here the reflection may be made, that if Greece should achieve her liberation, she will be indebted for the return of civilization and independence to the same peculiarities of geographical position and structure, to the same indelible features of nature, which raised her to greatness in ancient times. While her extensive sea coast and numerous islands and harbours rendered her the country of maritime commerce, and were the original cause of the opulence which led to perfection in the enjoyments and arts of civilized life, the mountainous structure of the interior generated that free and martial spirit, which, however cruelly suppressed, has never been completely destroyed.

We shall now offer a few remarks on that which we have already indicated as having had a powerful effect in retarding any movements of the Greeks for the assertion of their independence—

we mean the increase of the religion of Moham-
med in Albania.

Although it cannot be doubted that many
Greeks have abandoned the cross for the crescent,
since the Turkish conquest, and that there is a
considerable proportion of Greek blood in the
present race of Ottomans, as well from the male
as from the female side, it is nevertheless certain
that the Greeks have in general shewn an attach-
ment to their church, very remarkable in their
oppressed state, and highly honourable to the
nation. In return, their church has been a great
consolation to them in their servitude, has main-
tained union and nationality among them, and, by
preserving the use of the Hellenic in the church
service, has saved their language from the utter
corruption to which it would otherwise have been
exposed from the absence of all Greek literary
education, and from the mixture of the Turkish,
Albanian, and Bulgarian tongues.

The Albanians on the other hand, who are the
remains of the ancient Illyrians, a race in all times
very inferior to the Greeks in the scale of huma-
nity and civilization, and among whom Christia-
nity had probably never taken a very deep root,

have shewn a much slighter regard for their religion since the period of the Ottoman invasion, although they have not had that degree of excuse for their apostacy, which the complete subjugation of some parts of Greece may be thought to have afforded to the Greeks. Half the Albanian nation has relinquished the Christian faith for that of Mohammed. The poverty of the soil prompting a large portion of the people to seek a subsistence abroad, and the military habits acquired in their domestic wars leading the greater part of them to prefer the profession of arms, their reputation as soldiers has increased as the Osmanlys have degenerated, until they have become the only effective infantry in the Turkish dominions, and are to be found in the service of almost every Turkish chieftain in Europe, Asia, and Africa.

This enterprizing, poor, and mercenary people was not slow in perceiving the advantages attached to a conformity with the governing religion; that it opened to them a road to all the distinctions which the Ottoman government affords, or at least that it facilitated the acquisition of a fortune, with which they might retire to their native mountains. Some of the chieftains, supported by their followers, obtained possession of small dis-

tricts in Northern Greece, and even in the Moréa; while others endeavoured to increase their power and possessions in Albania, where these acquisitions being generally made at the expense of their Christian neighbours, numerous families of the latter were forced to emigrate into Greece and other parts of Turkey in pursuit of subsistence by trade or agriculture; while others, sometimes by whole districts at a time, converted their churches into mosques, made peace with their Moslem neighbours, retained their possessions, and became partakers of the advantages enjoyed by the profession of the Islam.

The apostacy of Albania having advanced in an increasing ratio, its effects have been most felt in the last half century, or at the same time that the moral and political changes, which we have already described in the Greeks, have been most remarkable. When it is considered therefore that, in this period, insurrections encouraged by an enemy of the Porte, have twice been quelled chiefly by the Musulman Albanians, and that the military strength of the Turkish government in Greece has of late years been derived almost entirely from them, it seems evident, that it is to the conversion of so large a proportion of the Alba-

nian nation to the faith of Mohammed, that the Porte is indebted for having so long been able to maintain any degree of authority over Greece.

However the Turks may despise the Albanians as Moslems; however they may detest them for their superiority in military qualities, and for the success with which their chieftains have generally maintained, in defiance of the Porte, their acquired authority in Greece and Albania, the community of religious interests which unites all classes of Mohammedans against Christianity has a corresponding political effect here as well as in every part of the Musulman world; for it cannot be doubted that the union of the Ottoman empire has been not less supported by the common fear and common hatred of Christians, entertained by the followers of Mohammed, all of whom, to the westward of Persia, look to the Sultan as the head of the church, than by the mutual jealousies of the great powers of Europe.

It will readily be supposed, from what has been stated, that the far greater part of the Albanian soldiers in the service of the Porte, or of the provincial governors in European Turkey, Asia Minor, Egypt, and Barbary, are Mohammedans.

Some Christian tribes, especially the Roman

Catholics of the north of Albania, are occasionally found in that situation: but in general, the Christian Albanian soldiers have either remained at home for the defence of their native districts, or have entered into the service of the Greek governors of the Ultra-Danubian provinces, or have joined the bands of robbers which infest various parts of European Turkey, or have been united to the Armatolí and Kleftes of Greece.

The Armatolí (*ἀρματοῦλοι*), or Greek militia, was an establishment of the Byzantine empire; their most important employment was to keep the roads free from danger, and to guard the *Κλεισοῦραι*, or mountain-passes, which are so frequent in Greece, and of so much military importance. The Ottomans found it necessary to maintain the same kind of police; in some instances the inhabitants of the district adjacent to the passes were made responsible for the safety of the roads, were authorized to maintain Armatolí for this purpose; and, in consideration of the trust and expense, were allowed certain privileges, such as that of being exempted from the customary burthen of entertaining persons travelling in the service, or under the protection of the government. The villages of the Elutheris and Megaris, occupying

the approaches to the Isthmus, were thus constituted, and were hence called the Derveno-Khoria, from the Persian word *Derbend* (pass). In addition to the bodies of *Armatolí*, acknowledged by the *Porte*, all the mountain communities, in their various degrees of submission to the Turkish government, maintained a small body of *Armatolí*, for the maintenance of the police, or for the protection of the district, and who were often employed against a neighbouring rival, or still oftener to resist, or at least to check, the encroachments of Mohammedan extortion, whether Turkish or Albanian. And thus there was constantly a school, however rude, for the military profession in Greece.

In Northern Greece the *Porte* had found it convenient to place the care of all the passes in the hands of one *Dervenjí*, or *Κλεισουράρχης*, as this officer was called under the Byzantine empire. It was from his appointment of *Dervenjí Bashi*, that *Aly Pasha* of *Ioannina* dated his fortune and his power. Having succeeded in recommending himself to the *Porte*, as a fit person to be employed to protect the roads, and to suppress the the resistance to Turkish authority, which so often manifested itself among the mountaineers, he

soon, by means of the authority thus acquired, increased his wealth and his influence in Albania to such a degree, that the Porte was never able to take the guardianship of the passes out of his hands; and he took good care that some complaint of robbers, together with some petition to the Porte in favour of his holding the office, should never be wanting, when, in consequence of any political change at Constantinople, he had reason to fear the decline of his influence.

He affected to treat all those, who resisted his authority, as robbers [*κλέφταις*]; he omitted no opportunity of boasting of the safety of the roads within his territories, and in this he generally received the favourable suffrage of the stranger, who, feeling the benefit of the security derived from Aly's strong government, might contrast it with the dangers to which he was often liable in the Moréa from rebellious Armatolí, who easily found a retreat from the Turkish power in the mountains of Laconia and Arcadia.

As the power of Aly extended over Greece, the greater part of the Armatolí became troops in his service, contributing to maintain his authority, and giving him the reputation of preserving security of person and property; but, in fact, allowing

of no plunder but that which was directed by himself for his own sole benefit, and which pervaded every place and in every form of extortion, where his influence was completely established.

As some of the most secluded districts of Northern Greece held out against him to the last, and as his Armatolí were often provoked by his avarice and treachery to join the armed insurgents, his habitual opponents, the Kleftes, were never entirely suppressed. And hence it will easily be understood that the Armatolí and Kleftes of Greece differed only in the circumstances in which they were placed: and that, although the latter were often obliged by necessity to resort to plunder, and to imitate the cruelty of their opponents, they were less to be considered as robbers, than as rebels against the government. Like the pirates of the Ægæan in the early ages of Greece,* their name carried no disgrace with it. On the contrary, their cause being connected with the assertion of national and Christian freedom against infidel oppression, and their life being passed in continual dangers, amidst the most romantic scenery, were calculated to call forth the

* Thucyd. i. i.

poetical and enthusiastic spirit inherent in the people, and to keep alive among them the love of liberty and the hope of independence.

As long as a Christian tribe maintained itself in one of the strongest positions of Northern Greece, the mountain population maintained in many places that degree of liberty and self-protection which it had enjoyed from the time of the Turkish conquest; but when *Suli*, after a valiant resistance of thirteen years against all the resources of the power, wealth, craft, and treachery of Aly, had sunk under the effects of famine and deficient numbers, his influence found its way into every part of Northern Greece, and left very few retreats in which the Greeks could enjoy the fruits of their industry in safety.

It was most fortunate for the Ottoman government, that when the causes, which have at length produced a general insurrection, had begun to operate very extensively, and when the French revolution, and the ambition of its leaders, threatened the Porte with an immediate explosion, the military strength of Greece and Albania was more concentrated than ever.

Aly Pasha may have thwarted the execution of all the measures of the Porte which tended to

reduce his authority, and in general those which did not originate with himself; he may have transmitted a larger sum to Constantinople in the shape of presents to persons in power, than in that of tribute to the imperial treasury; and, in the latter respect, he may never have sent as much as satisfied the wishes of government; nevertheless it is probable that the Porte, during his reign, was more truly master of Greece than it had ever been before, and that it derived, upon the whole, as much revenue from the country; while it is certain, that by leaving Aly to oppose the armed Greeks to one another, and to suppress the spirit of revolt by the military strength of Albania, she most effectually secured herself against the consequences of foreign intrigues among the Christian subjects of European Turkey; and that the concentration of power in Aly's hands was the best protection which the empire could possess on a frontier, where it was endangered by the increase of the power of France, not less than the North-Eeastern side was menaced by the encroachments of Russia.

We may now proceed to lay before the reader a brief narrative of the origin and progress of the Greek insurrection.

No sooner had the present Sultan Mahmoud been placed upon the throne, than he began to indicate talents and a temper not easily directed by others, together with an intention of pursuing a line of policy, which, founded on Mohammedan bigotry, and on ignorance of the real situation of his empire, was less suited to his own times than to those of Selim the First or Solyman the Second. One of his favourite projects was the destruction of the great chieftains who, in several of the provinces, partly from motives of ambition, and partly in their own defence against the avidity and treachery of the Porte, had retained their offices for a long succession of years, in opposition to all the attempts of the supreme government to remove them, gradually increasing the circle of their power, placing their relations and dependents in subordinate situations around them, and in some instances transmitting their authority to their heirs.

This usurpation of power by a few strong hands, although at once both a consequence and a cause of the weakness of the Ottoman government, had, as we have already hinted, been the best security of the empire, during the dangers of the French revolution; and, if prudently ma-

naged, might still have saved it for some time from the effects of the degeneracy of the people, both as Moslems and as soldiers, which, when contrasted with the great advances made by Christian Europe in military power and the art of war, has now for many years threatened Turkey with the most imminent danger. But the Porte, blind to more important considerations, was sensible only to wounded pride and to the loss of immediate authority and revenue. Before Mahmoud had been ten years on the throne, none of the great permanent provincial governors remained, except Aly of Ioannina and Mohammed Aly of Egypt, the latter of whom can hardly enter into consideration on this occasion, Egypt having seldom been thoroughly under the dominion of the Porte, but generally in an intermediate state between the submission of the Ottoman provinces and the mere nominal subjection of the Barbary states.

It was not until after the general pacification of Europe, that the Sultan and his favourite counsellors, finding the Albanian Aly no longer important in the protection of the North-Western frontier of the empire, and impatient to obtain his treasures before his death should place them in

the hands of his sons, began their operations against him by favouring his enemy Ismail Pashó Bey, who, no longer daring to reside at Ioannina, had become a fugitive at Constantinople. An imprudent attempt of some emissaries of Aly in the spring of 1820 to assassinate Ismaïl, became the chief ostensible cause of the Firmahn which was immediately issued against Aly, and which was followed by the appointment of Ismaïl to the Pashalik of Ioannina, and to the command of the army which was destined to reduce that place.

As in every great revolution, it is found that many concurrent causes prepare the way, but that one fortuitous event determines the period of its commencement, so it cannot be doubted that the declaration of the Porte against Aly was the immediate cause of the Greek insurrection. The great preparing cause, as we have already seen, was the degeneracy of the one people and the improvement of the other: the recent example of Spanish America, of Spain itself, of Portugal, and of Italy, formed undoubtedly another link in the chain of circumstances, destined by Providence to bring about this event.

The Greeks residing in Europe had naturally been in the habit of looking chiefly to Russia as

the means by which their country was to be liberated, and at the beginning of the year 1820, the increasing disagreement between the court of St. Petersburg and the Porte had revived the hopes which rested on this foundation. Already had some of the adherents of Russia in Greece endeavoured to anticipate the views of that cabinet by preparing the people for a connection with Russia in case of a war, and the proceeding easily obtained credit for being authorized, whether it really were so or not, when a Greek was the foreign minister of the Emperor Alexander.

Such was the state of affairs when the rupture between Aly Pasha and the Porte at once made it evident to those best acquainted with the country that it would be impossible for the Porte ever to bring back Greece to its former state of subordination. If it required the powerful arm of Aly to maintain order in Northern Greece, and an annual visit of the Turkish fleet to the Moréa, to suppress the spirit of revolt in that peninsula, and to keep the mountaineers of Laconia in a state of half submission, what was to be expected when it became the interest of Aly to attract the armed Greeks and Albanians to his side against the Porte, and when the Turkish navy should be

crippled by the desertion of the Greeks, who formed the most numerous as well as most skilful portion of its seamen?

The first step of Aly, on receiving the firmahn of the Porte, which declared him a rebel, was to concert operations with the Greek chiefs who had been under his command as Dervenjí, and who occupied, with their Armatolí, all the mountainous parts of Greece beyond the Isthmus, and especially the passes which lead from every quarter into the basin of Thessaly. The Turks, on their side, were equally sensible of the importance of these mountainous districts in the contest which the Porte had undertaken. Suleyman Pasha, on entering Thessaly as Seraskier, resorted to the dangerous expedient of addressing a proclamation to the ecclesiastics, the civil primates, and other persons in authority in Thessaly and the adjoining mountains, authorizing the people to take up arms against Aly. It has been supposed, however, that this measure was either an unauthorized act of the Turkish commander, of which the Porte disapproved, or that it was an intrigue not thoroughly known to Suleyman himself, but devised by his Greek secretary, who issued the plocamation in his *own* language only; for the

Seraskier was very soon removed from his command, and beheaded.

But the consequences were not to be remedied: the Greeks, authorized to take up arms, and appealed to on both sides, were not slow either in perceiving the advantages that might be derived from these circumstances to the nation, or in preparing to make them available. Nor was it long before they had sufficient provocation to turn their arms against the Osmanlys: for no sooner had these lawless troops entered Greece than they ravaged all the plains of Thessaly, Phocis, Bœotia, and Attica, and drove great numbers of defenceless inhabitants to seek refuge in the mountains.

Aly experienced the usual fate of selfish tyrants when fortune turns against them. In less than six months after the Porte had issued the proscription against him, he had been abandoned by his allies, his chief officers had betrayed him, and of his mercenary troops, the Christians had retired into their native districts, while the greater part of the Musulmans had entered the service of the Turkish Pasha before *Ioannina*. Scarcely had a division of the Ottoman fleet made its appearance on the western coast of Greece, when two of Aly's sons and one of his grandsons surrendered them-

selves and the fortresses of *Prévyza*, and *Parga*,* into the hands of the Turkish Admiral, who soon persuaded also the elder son, Muktar, to follow the example of his brothers, and to give up the strong fortress of Argyró Kastro, into which he had retired after having abandoned the still more important post of Beráti, and to accept in exchange a nominal government in Asia Minor, destined of course to be his grave if he should ever be permitted to reach it.

Aly now gave the strongest proof that his hopes rested solely on the armed Christians, by surrendering to the Suliotes the castle which he had built on the site of one of those strong holds from whence it had been the occupation of a great part of his life to expel them ; and the winter of 1820-1 had hardly expired before he perceived, that he had become little more than an instrument in the hands of the Greeks for the recovery of their independence. Such was the position of affairs when an occurrence in the ultra-Danubian provinces of Turkey had a powerful effect in promoting the insurrection of Greece. An association

* Naupactus had been evacuated by Aly's second son, Vely Pasha, and had been occupied by an officer of the Porte, before the Turkish fleet arrived on the coast.

of Greeks, styling itself the Society of Friends, (ἡ ἑταιρεία φιλική) had been formed in the dominions of Austria and Russia about the year 1814, in imitation of the revolutionary societies then prevalent in Italy and Germany. The liberation and revival of Greece, which, in fact, had always been the ultimate object of the exertions made by the Greeks residing in civilized Europe, in favour of their brethren in Turkey, was the design to which the members of the *Hetæreia* bound themselves by oath to devote their lives and fortunes. Inflamed by the revolutionary state of Europe in the year 1820, the association thought that the quarrel between Aly and the Porte, the seditious attitude of Servia, and the discontents of Wallachia and Moldavia, which, in February, 1821, had broken out into open acts of violence, presented the desired crisis for attempting a general insurrection of the Christian population of Turkey against their Mohammedan oppressors. On the 7th of March, 1821, Alexander Ypsilanti, a Major General in the Russian service, and son of a former Greek governor of Wallachia, entered Moldavia with a corps of Greeks, and in concert with Michael Sutzó, the reigning Greek governor of that province, issued a proclamation inviting the

Christians to arms, and promising them in not very ambiguous terms the support of Russia.

But the spirit of discontent in the two Dacian provinces having been chiefly directed against the oppression of the Boyars or native aristocracy, and against the Greek government itself in the exercise of its delegated power, was productive of little or no assistance to Ypsilanti's proceedings. The Servians were equally inefficient, and the Emperor Alexander, who was then at Laybach, having immediately disavowed the proceedings of Ypsilanti and Sutzo, the issue of the attempt could not long be doubtful; after some acts of cruelty perpetrated on both sides, the expedition ended in the evacuation of Yassy by Ypsilanti, and of Bukarest by Theodore, chief of the Vlach-Moldavian insurgents, whom Ypsilanti shortly afterwards seized, and put to death, he himself retreating after an action in which the Greeks are stated to have conducted themselves gallantly, into the Austrian dominions, where he was immediately seized by the government and immured in a dungeon.

Transitory as were the effects of this rash and ill-conducted enterprise in the Dacian provinces, it had the greatest influence in exciting the insur-

rection in Greece, properly so called, where the war in Epirus, and the hopes, the movements, and the designs which had been its consequence throughout Northern Greece, had already produced a corresponding ferment in the *Moréa*. The first open act of rebellion in the peninsula was caused by some tardy steps taken by the provincial government at *Tripolitza* to execute the decree of the Porte, customary in all cases of alarm, for disarming the Christians and for receiving hostages from the principal families and churchmen. The example of resistance was set in the end of March by Germanós, bishop of Patræ, who having been summoned to the capital, had proceeded as far as *Kalávryta*,* when finding the people, together with a body of *Armatolí*, well disposed to his views, he openly raised the standard of independence and of the Cross, which was immediately followed by a similar manifestation at Patræ.† The *Maniátes*, descending from Mount

* The ancient Cynætheia, an Arcadian city on the frontier of Achaia. We have preferred using the ancient names, wherever it can be done without ambiguity, because they are more defined and better known. The italic print has been employed to distinguish the modern names, whenever the distinction has appeared necessary.

† This attempt had no other effect than to cause the de-

Taygetum, speedily occupied the level districts of Laconia and Messenia. Before the end of April a senate had assembled at *Kalamáta*, in Messenia, on the borders of *Máni*, and the fleet of *Ydra*, raising the standard of the Cross, proceeded to *Psarú*, which, strong in its fortified rock and numerous ships, had been among the first to set the example of insurrection, although situated on the advanced posts of the enemy.*

After such simultaneous movements of rebellion at the two extremities of European Turkey, it was impossible to persuade the Turks that Russia had not an extensive design against them by the agency of their Christian population, and it would hardly have been in the power of the Porte to prevent its Musulman subjects from persecuting the numerous defenceless Christians who inhabit

struction of the town; for the garrison of the castle, having been speedily reinforced by Yussuf Pasha from Naupactus, and by the Albanian colony of *Lalla*, which was obliged to retreat before the insurgents, has been able to hold out ever since.

*-Psara (*τὰ Ψαρά*), called *ἡ Ψύλα* in the Odyssey, was already approaching its modern form of denomination in the time of Strabo, who writes it *τὰ Ψύγα*. Its harbour, and its position five miles from the north-west cape of Chios, in the main channel of the Ægæan, has in all times given some importance to this little island.

the capital, the towns and villages of Thrace, and the Western part of Asia Minor, even had the government been so disposed. But Sultan Mahmoud and his favourites, as if determined to provoke a general insurrection, themselves set the example of persecution, and by stamping it with the mark of religious hatred, were sure to find a ready instrument of their cruel vengeance in every Moslem of the empire. On the 22d April, being Easter-day, the greatest of the Greek festivals, Gregorios, Patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Greek church, acknowledged and appointed by the Porte, and who had recently issued his anathema against the insurgents, was seized and hanged before the patriarchal church in which he had been officiating; and as a consummation of ignominy in the eyes of the Greeks, his body was delivered to Jews to be dragged through the streets. And this murder was accompanied, or speedily followed, by that of several other ecclesiastics of the highest rank in the capital, or other parts of the empire, as well as by that of many other Greeks of every class.

The indignation and terror produced among the Greeks by these cruelties, were greatly heightened by the accompanying destruction of several

Greek churches, and a general conviction prevailed that they were but a prelude to an intended extermination of the whole people. The priesthood of the islands and of the Moréa, thinking themselves peculiarly marked out for destruction, hesitated not to increase the ferment by their spiritual influence; and while they represented the patriarch as a *martyr*, and inspired the rebellion with all the energy of religious warfare, the insurgents derived no small additional encouragement from the intimate persuasion that Russia was on the eve of a rupture with the Porte.

Ydra, *Psarú*, and *Petza**, were able to enter upon the naval campaign with a force of eighty or ninety vessels, of the average bulk of 250 tons, and the average strength of 12 guns. Fifty or sixty others of a somewhat smaller class, and many others still smaller, were supplied by the other islands, among the foremost of which may be reckoned Andrus, Scopelus, Myconus, Patmus, Casus, and Megiste now *Kastelóryzo*, on the coast of Lycia. In the latter end of May, the inferiority of the Turkish commanders and seamen in skill and enterprise was shown in the loss of one of their two-decked ships of war, which, having

* Better known by the Italian appellation of *Spetzia*.

been separated from the Turkish squadron near Lesbos, was stranded in endeavouring to escape from the Greeks at Eressus, on the western side of that island, and was there burnt by a fire-ship of *Ydra*.

If the events of 1820 had proved that the power of Aly Pasha rested on a basis of sand, those of 1821 shewed that the authority of the Porte in Greece was equally unstable. Soon after mid-summer, not only in the Peloponnesus, but throughout a great part of Northern Greece, as far as Thessalonica, the Turks had retired into the large towns and fortified places, and all the mountains and open country were either in the hands of the Greeks or exposed to their incursions. Agents had been sent to Europe for the purchase of arms and ammunition; many volunteers, as well Greeks as natives of civilized Europe, had arrived in the *Moréa*; and some generous contributions in money and the materials of war had been received from strangers, or from the opulent Greeks settled in some of the chief sea-ports of Europe.

The native Greeks who took the lead in the Peloponnesus were Peter Mavromikháli, who had been Bey of *Mani* under the Turks, and Constantine Kolokotróni, who, like his father, had long

been a chief of rebellious Peloponnesian Armatolí, and who had held military rank in the Russian and in the English services.

Of the other Greeks who joined the insurrection, the two of greatest note were Demetrius Ypsilanti, who, like his brother Alexander, was an officer in the Russian army, and Alexander Mavrokordáto, member of another of those Greek families of Constantinople upon whom the Porte was accustomed to confer the four great offices of state, held by Christians.* Ypsilanti at first appeared as the agent and deputy of his brother; but the latter, having totally failed in his attempt in the North, Demetrius was soon obliged to give up the high pretensions which he had connected with that character, and as both Hetærists and Russians have since gradually lost their credit in Greece, his influence has declined in proportion. Mavrokordáto was destined to act a more conspicuous and a more useful part.

The capture of *Monemvasía* and *Neó-kastro* or *Navarin* by the insurgents in the beginning of August, 1821, was followed by the investment of *Tripolitza*, of which operation Ypsilanti, by virtue

* Those of governor of Moldavia and of Wallachia, and those of interpreter to the Porte and to the fleet.

of his rank in the Russian service, assumed the management as far as that was possible among such a rabble, disobedient even to their native leaders, and still less likely to submit to a young man of whom those leaders were jealous.

Tripolitza, situated at the foot of Mount Mænalus on the edge of the plain which contained the ancient cities of Tegea, Pallantium, and Mantinea, was surrounded with a slight wall, flanked by towers at long intervals. At the south-western end a small citadel occupies a height, which is connected with the last falls of the mountain. In the towers and citadel were about fifty pieces of cannon, served by a company of artillerymen from Constantinople. Besides its own population of about 25,000, the town contained the Turkish refugees of *Londári* with their families, and almost the entire population of *Bardunia*, a part of Mount Taygetum, which, like *Lalla* near Olympia, had been colonized by Mohammedan Albanians. In addition to the armed men of these several people, were three or four thousand in the service of Khurshid Pasha, governor of the *Moréa*, about half of whom were Albanians. The command, if command it could be called, was in the hands of the *kihaya* or lieutenant of Khurshid, the pasha

himself having, by order of the Porte, joined the army before *Ioannina*, leaving his family at *Tripolitza*.

The Greeks at first were very inferior in numbers to their opponents; they had no cavalry; many of them were scarcely armed, and their besieging artillery consisted only of five or six cannon and two mortars, wretchedly deficient in their appurtenances, and managed by a few European adventurers. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that the best hopes of the Greeks were founded on cutting off the supplies of the town. But their opponents had a formidable cavalry, and few of the Greeks were yet superior to that innate dread of their late masters, which had made them, on some late occasions, fly from about one-tenth of their number of the Turkish horsemen. At first, collected in irregular bodies under their several chieftains, they occupied the slopes of Mount Mænalus. By degrees they approached nearer to the walls, took advantage of the cover afforded by the heights near the citadel, placed their ordnance in battery on the most commanding parts of the hills, and at length, as their numbers and confidence increased, they effected a lodgment in some ruined villages in the plain to the eastward

of the city; and having thus prevented the Turkish cavalry from foraging at a distance from the walls, the distress both of the garrison and inhabitants soon became excessive.

In the middle of September, the besieged were encouraged in their resistance by the intelligence of the arrival of the Turkish fleet, which, after making an unsuccessful attempt upon *Kalamáta*, and, after throwing supplies into *Mothóni* and *Koróni*, had been joined at Patræ by some Algerine ships, as well as by the Kapitána Bay or Commodore, who had been employed on the coast of Epirus against Aly, and who brought a body of Albanians to Patræ. The besieged soon discovered, however, that little hope of succour was to be derived from that quarter, for Ypsilanti having proceeded to occupy the Arcadian passes towards Patræ, no attempt was made from thence to relieve *Tripolitza*, and its investment was never interrupted. One cause of this inactivity on the part of the Turkish commander was the failure of the attempt, which had been made in the early part of the month by their army in Thessaly, to penetrate into Bœotia. They had been met by the insurgents at *Fondána* in the pass of Mount Cnemis, leading from the head of the Maliac gulf

into Phocis, and had been obliged to retreat with considerable loss ; no hope remained therefore of any co-operation by the way of the Isthmus.

As the distresses of the besieged increased, so also did the disagreements among their several leaders. Attempts were made to enter into a treaty of capitulation, but the absence of Ypsilanti, and of the Europeans who accompanied him, having put an end to the little resemblance to a regular army, which had before existed, it was impossible to arrange any terms in which the besieged could have the smallest confidence. From this time there seems to have been an end to all discipline and concert of measures on both sides. The principal men of the city thought only of saving themselves and families, and the Greek chiefs of turning the circumstances to their personal advantage. The Albanians in the service of Khurshid made a separate agreement for their unmolested return to Albania. Several rich Turks and Jews purchased the promise of a safe conduct from Kolokotróni and Mavromikháli ; but these, though they received the price of their engagements, were never able to execute them. On the 5th of October, some of their followers, having discovered what was passing, and being

resolved not to be defrauded of their expected plunder by the selfish avidity of their leaders, assaulted the walls on the northern side, and were speedily followed into the city by all the besieging forces.

For two days the town was given up to those horrors formerly common under such circumstances, but which are now happily almost banished from civilized warfare. That *Tripolitza* should have been saved from them in the position as well previous as actual of the contending parties, it would have been unreasonable to expect. Suffice it to say, that every kind of excess which a wanton indulgence in cruelty and a thirst of plunder could suggest, was inflicted on the Turkish and Jewish inhabitants of this unhappy place; and that, when victims failed within the walls, the Greeks proceeded to put to death a large body of defenceless inhabitants, who, having been allowed to remove from the town in consequence of the famine, still remained in the vicinity. On the third day after the assault, the Albanians, who had quitted the place in safety, which they owed less to the good faith of the enemy than to the protection of their arms, departed towards Patraë; and on the following day the citadel capitulated to Kolokotrôni.

Of the hostages who had been received from different parts of the Peninsula in the spring, two-thirds had perished by sickness, ill usage, or actual violence. Although this circumstance may have increased the sufferings of the captured city, it cannot be supposed to have had much influence upon its fate ; this is too well accounted for by the character of its assailants, a great part of whom had been robbers or pirates, and whose savage disposition was neither repressed by any treaty with the besieged, or by the influence of any civilized individuals of their own nation or of any other. The Greek chieftains had sufficient power only to save the harem of the Pasha, together with the Bey of Corinth, and a few others of the enemy, whose influence it was thought might be useful in the sequel.

Both in a military and political point of view, the capture of *Tripolitza* was a most important event for the Greeks. It gave them all the interior of the Peninsula, and confined the Osmanlys to five maritime fortresses. It frustrated the hopes of the Turkish admiral, furnished arms for several thousand men, and inspired great confidence in the ultimate success of the insurrection at a critical moment. Although it added very little to a better

administration of affairs, and not a dollar to the national treasury, it enabled the chieftains to keep their forces united by regular pay, and hence gave them greater authority in promoting any designs of utility, as well as greater power for the future in repressing the cruelty and ill faith which had disgraced the cause at *Navarin*, as well as at *Tripolitza*, and which rendered the acquisition of the other fortresses in the *Morée* more difficult, by obliging the Turkish garrisons to hold out to the utmost extremity.

Not that we suppose it would have been possible, by any degree of caution and humanity on the part of the leaders of the insurrection in the Peloponnesus, to have prevented by their example the horrid cruelties which were perpetrated in other parts of the empire, wherever the unarmed Greeks were left at the mercy of a large Turkish population, or wherever the lower orders of Greeks, in the first intoxication of freedom, and amenable to no tribunal of their own nation, could find an opportunity of indulging the vindictive feelings which for so many ages had been rankling in the bosoms of their race. These cruelties were the inevitable consequence of the previous position of

the two people: but the Greeks have been immensely the losers in the sad account of misery and slaughter; for the insurgents, having been reduced to the desperate necessity of pursuing the main object of their liberation without any regard to the fatal effects which it might have on their brethren more exposed than themselves to Turkish vengeance, the result has been, that while all the numerous Greek families, inhabiting the maritime districts, or the great towns of the European and Anatolian divisions of the empire, have been and still are entirely at the mercy of their oppressors; it has been only in some parts of Northern Greece and the *Morée*, or in a few of the islands, or in the incursions of the islanders on the coast of Asia, or on being intercepted at sea by the Greek ships on their return from the Levant in the first year of the war, that the Turks have been exposed to cruel treatment from the Greeks. The Turks of Greece were few in number; they were armed, they resided chiefly in fortified places, or they had it in their power to retire into the fortresses; so that, in fact, the Greeks have had little opportunity except at *Tripolitza*, of retaliating upon the defenceless families of the Turks for the fate

of so many thousand Greek women and children whose mildest lot has been that of being sold for slaves.

We have dwelt upon the proceedings at *Tripolitza* at some length because they give a good idea of the state of the people at the beginning of the insurrection, and shew how totally unprepared the Greeks were, both in a moral and military sense, for the great attempt upon which they had embarked, and the very rashness of which one cannot but admire.

If the savage customs engendered by long subjection to an Oriental yoke appear at this period of the contest in all their deformity, the subsequent history of the insurrection seems to indicate, that they are already giving way to the effects of a consciousness of the dignity of the new position which the people is assuming: it can hardly be doubted, that these sentiments, combined with a better knowledge of regular warfare, which the volunteers from civilized Europe will introduce among them, together with a longer practice of war, which cannot fail to call forth the nobler qualities of the people, will cause the selfishness and cruelty of the robber gradually to give place to a conduct more liberal, and to a more patriotic

and enlightened feeling for the general welfare of Greece.

By the loss of *Tripolitza*, the Turkish admiral was obliged to confine his operations to the destruction of *Galaxídhí*, a Greek town which had risen to considerable opulence by maritime commerce, upon the site of the ancient *Ceanthe*, in the *Crissæan* bay of the gulf of *Corinth*; and the ships of which place were prevented from joining the insurgents in the *Ægæan* sea, by the enemy's position at the entrance of the gulf. The Turks burnt the town, captured thirty or forty Greek ships which were lying there, and by this operation became undisturbed masters of the *Corinthian* gulf, into which the Greeks, however strong, can not venture to pursue them, as long as they remain masters of *Patræ*, *Naupactus*, and of the two intermediate castles. These castles, called the castles of the *Moréa* and of *Rúmeli*, stand upon the ancient promontories of *Rhium* and *Antirrhium*, on either side of a strait a mile in width, and thus command the entrance of the gulf.

Having left a squadron in possession of the gulf of *Corinth* and bay of *Patræ*, the captain pasha quitted the latter place in the beginning of *October*, on his return to the *Dardanelles*. Near *Zante*

he was met by a great number of Greek vessels, but without any result except the loss of one of his small ships of war, which was stranded and burnt in the port of *Kierí* in that island.

This year the Turks had been surprised: they began the campaign of 1822 better prepared, and with the advantage of having at length obtained possession of the last strong hold of Aly Pasha, whose cause had become almost identified with that of the Greeks. Khurshid Pasha was now charged with the entire conduct of the war in Greece, and Omér, a Toshke Albanian of *Verghiondí*, near *Beráti*, (and hence commonly called Omer Vrionis) who had distinguished himself in the service of the Viceroy of Egypt, particularly against the English at Rosetta, in 1807, received the pashalik of *Ioannina* and *Arta*, in the room Ismaïl, as a reward for having set the example of treachery towards his late master Aly, by opening the passes of Pindus to Ismaïl on his first advance to *Ioannina*, in 1820. The exhibition of Aly's head at the imperial gate, in February, 1822, and the triumphal conveyance into the capital of a part of his spoils, excited a degree of enthusiasm very useful to the cause of the sultan at an important moment: but a small part only of the pasha's gold

reached the imperial treasury, while the substitution of one Albanian for another in the government of *Ioannina* showed how completely the Greek insurrection had thwarted the design of the Porte for increasing its authority in Epirus; affairs having in fact become less favourable to the future influence of the Porte over Albania, than they had been under Aly, or than they would have been under the government of his sons.

Nevertheless the spring of 1822 was the crisis of Grecian liberty, and its cause appeared to many persons little better than desperate. On one side was a power larger in extent of territory than any in Europe; which had maintained its station for near four centuries, in one of the most commanding positions in the world; whose integrity was admitted by all the other great powers to be essential to the general peace; ready, by the nature of its government, to enter upon war at a short notice, and furnished with all the fiscal, military, and naval establishments of a monarchy of long standing. On the other, were the inhabitants of a small province of this extensive empire, without any central authority, without cavalry, artillery, magazines, hospitals, or military chest, whose whole military force, in short, consisted only of a

rude undisciplined infantry, armed with an awkward long musket, to which was added, according to the circumstances of the individual, pistols, a dagger, or a sword—ignorant of the use of the bayonet, acknowledging no discipline, and more uninstructed in war as an art than the Greeks of the heroic ages,—led, indeed, by men possessing courage and enterprize, and some of the essential qualifications of command, but who were scarcely less ignorant and unenlightened than their soldiers, and too selfish to lose any opportunity of enriching themselves, or to preserve that harmony with the other leading men, which was so necessary in the dangerous position of the country.

There were circumstances, however, which rendered the inequality between the two parties more apparent than real, and there were others which, although more distant perhaps in their effects, are so powerful, that they will probably have the effect of excluding the Turks from the Peloponnesus for ever, and may even ultimately expel them from Europe.

Among the former may be reckoned the degeneracy of the present race of Turks as soldiers; the ignorance and inexperience of their commanders, often raised from situations the least fitted

to give military knowledge; the total want of subordinate staff officers, or of officers of any kind qualified for the conduct of a campaign; their deficiency in any organized system of supplies in the field; the corruption of the government in every gradation; and, though last, not least, the poverty of the Porte, which has long disabled it from supporting a corps of Janissaries much greater than is necessary for the garrisons of the empire: thus leaving an army in the field to depend principally for its numbers upon the followers of the provincial governors, added to the feudal and local militia who, from ancient custom, are exempted from keeping the field between November and May, and who never fail to return home in the winter. And hence it has occurred that, for many years past, the Porte has been unable, except perhaps on the northern frontier, where are the principal garrisons of the Janissaries, to keep together an army of 10,000 men for more than six months, or even for a shorter time, unless when plunder is immediately in view.* So great, nevertheless, are the re-

* In the winters of 1799 and 1800, the army of the Grand Vizier in Syria was reduced to less than 5000, but on entering Egypt in 1800 and 1801, there were not less than 40 or

sources of such an extensive empire as Turkey in supplying its yearly losses, and in thus enabling the government to repeat its attacks indefinitely, that its deficiencies might not have much affected the final result against a people more unprovided than themselves, had not that people been a Christian nation, and situated on the borders of Christian Europe, where religious sympathy, although it may not have been very warmly felt at first, must at length be excited as the contest proceeds, and from whence assistance will, at first secretly, and at last openly, be afforded to struggling fellow-Christians, until public opinion throughout Europe shall identify the success of the insurrection with the cause of Christianity itself.

While the Greeks show a remarkable quickness in adopting the improvements of European art and science, of which we have a striking ex-

50,000 collected. We have seen what clouds of Asiatic Turks were instantly collected by the plunder of Chios. It may be asked how have the Russians been prevented of late years from marching to Constantinople. But the northern frontier, as we have just observed, is an exception, and although the Turks have ceased to distinguish themselves in a regular campaign, it is evident that a people among whom every man is armed, and animated by religious as well as national hatred, may still offer a formidable resistance to the advance of an enemy through their own country.

ample in the use they have already made of fireships; the Turks, whose patriotism chiefly shows itself in bigotry and the persecution of all other religions, and whose government, however desirous, has always found it impossible to give the necessary encouragement and protection to Europeans willing to assist them with their military skill, will be left to its own exertions, and the precarious aid of the Musulman powers of Africa.

It is obvious that a contest between two people such as we have just described cannot resemble war as it is carried on between two of the civilized nations of Europe, equally practised in the art of war, and equally provided with its materials. A people possessing only an irregular infantry cannot meet cavalry and artillery in the plains, but however adventurous they may be, are of necessity reduced to a defensive war in their own mountains. In like manner, the merchant brigs and polaccas of the Greeks, though well manned and skilfully conducted, cannot be expected to place themselves alongside the two-decked ships and frigates of the Turks. Many persons who have not considered these circumstances have ascribed to a want of courage and enterprize on

the part of the Greeks, that which has been the inevitable consequence of the military position and resources of the two people.

In the beginning of 1822, the Greeks had already begun to feel the benefit of some of their advantages; the good wishes and good offices of the people of Europe were shown by meetings in various countries to assist the cause with officers, ammunition, and money, while the unanimity which the hope of liberty and a single year of successful insurrection had excited in the nation itself was no less manifested by the assemblage of deputies from every part of insurgent Greece, who, having met at *Piadha*, in the Epidauria, on the 1st January, 1822, promulgated their independence, and instituted a provisional constitution.

Two circumstances also occurred at this time, very encouraging to the Greeks and to their well-wishers in Europe, though neither of them was destined to give any permanent advantage to the cause. One was the hostilities which had broken out on the Persian frontier of Turkey, and which at least gave the Turks of the eastern part of Asia Minor an excuse, always readily seized by them, for keeping their contingents at home. The other was, the surrender of the Acro-Corinthus, one of

the fortresses which had been constructed by the Venetians when in possession of the *Moréa*; and a point which will be of the utmost importance to the protection of the peninsula, when the Greeks know how to make use of it.

But the immediate cause of their successful resistance in the campaign of 1822 is to be found in the peculiar nature of the country; in the sufficiency of the Greek troops to the defence of their mountains against an enemy who had no infantry of a similar kind, except that of Albania, which was chiefly confined to western Greece; in the unfitness of cavalry alone, and especially such irregular and undisciplined cavalry as that of the Turks, to retain the country which it overran, and to keep up the communication between the districts to the southward of Mount *Ceta* and the positions in Thessaly, where alone they had any magazine; but, above all, it was derived from the great defensive strength of the approaches to the Peloponnesus, as well as from that of the peninsula itself, when assisted by such a naval force as obliges the enemy to make his principal attack by land through the Isthmus.

And here it may be necessary to define the meaning of the chorographical expressions which

we shall have occasion to employ in describing the proceedings of the two contending parties.

In terms most general, Greece may be divided into Insular, Peninsular, and Continental, or, in other words, the Islands, the Peloponnesus, and Northern Greece. The last of these may be subdivided into Greece to the South and to the North of Mount *Œta*, the latter containing Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia, and including also the modern subdivision of *Albania*, the whole of which is comprehended in the ancient Epirus, or within the most extended limits of Macedonia.

But the division of Greece, political and military, which has been adopted by the Greek government, is that of the Islands, the *Moréa*, Eastern Greece, and Western Greece; of the two latter the great ridge of *Pindus* forms the separation: for this range of mountains runs from north to south through the whole extent of Northern Greece, dividing it longitudinally into two unequal parts, (the eastern being the greater,) and terminating in the Corinthian gulph, between *Naupactus* and the *Crissæan* bay.

The defensive strength of the Peloponnesus by land does not in the present circumstances consist in its isthmus, which, being formed of low land, four miles in breadth, offers no means of resisting

very superior numbers, without a large regular army, and such assistance from art as is totally out of the power of the Greeks. In the hands of such troops as theirs, the great protection of the *Moréa* from the northward lies in that double barrier of mountains which separates the isthmus from Bœotia; the first of these, anciently known by the names of the Oneia and Gerenia, lies between the Isthmus and the plain of Megara; the second, under the ancient names of Cithæron and Parnes, stretches from the Corinthian to the Euboic gulf. Athens lies between the two lines, but it is separated by such strong defiles from the Megaris, that it may be doubted whether the direct route from Bœotia into the Megaris across Cithæron, or the circuitous route through the passes of Mount Parnes and the Eleusinia is the more difficult, in the presence of an active enemy; and there is scarcely a third choice, for the approach along the steep shore of the gulph of Corinth is of the most hazardous kind, particularly on the cornice of Cithæron, between Creusis and Ægosthenæ, the difficulties of which route are illustrated on two occasions in the Hellenics of Xenophon.*

* l. v. c. 4. l. vi. c. 4.

The Bœotian plains terminate to the north-west in the valley of Phocis and Doris, watered by the Cephissus and its branches, which have their origin in Mount Cæta. This valley separates Mount Parnassus from a prolongation of Cæta, anciently known by the names of Callidromus and Cnemis, the northern face of which looks down on the valley of Spercheius and the Maliac gulf, where some hot sources issuing into the maritime marshes at the foot of the steepest part of Mount Callidromus gave name to the celebrated pass of Thermopylæ. The valley of the Spercheius extends thirty miles westward into the interior; to the north it is separated from the great plains of Thessaly by a branch of Mount Othrys, which stretches eastward to the Pagasetic or Pelasgic gulf, and towards the west is connected with the mountains of Dolopia, and through them with Mount Pindus, and the barriers which separate Eastern from Western Greece.

As Callidromus is immediately connected with the highest summits of Cæta, which mountain extends quite across the continent to the Ambracian gulf and to the coast of Acarnania, it was impossible for the Turks to dislodge the insurgents, unless momentarily, from their positions in Cnemis

and Callidromus ; but, on the other hand, as the Turks possessed the post of *Zitúni*, (the ancient Lamia,) situated at the important point where the road from Thessaly, through the branch of Othrys just mentioned emerges into the valley of the Spercheius over against Thermopylæ, there remained no positions capable of offering any impediment to the Ottoman forces between the north of Thessaly and the barriers of the Megaris, except those of Callidromus and Cnemis, which contain the passes leading from the valley of the Spercheius into that of the Cephissus. As to Thermopylæ itself, it is no longer of the same importance as in the time of the Persian, or even of the Gallic invasion of Greece, the new land formed at the mouth of the Spercheius having rendered it easy in summer, for an army provided with means for crossing the river, to turn the pass to the eastward. This had been actually done by the Turkish army in September, 1821, just before their defeat in the passes of Mount Cnemis.

As a position of great strength in itself, however, and as a central point for observing the enemy in the Maliac district, and for occupying the passes of the Callidromus, with a view to interrupt his communication between Thessaly and

Bœotia, and to harass his advance or retreat, Thermopylæ is a post of the first importance, and, as such, it has, from the beginning, been occupied by the Greeks.

In Western Greece, which we have already designated as the country lying westward of the crest of Mount Pindus, there is a series of plains and vallies lying between that mountain and a parallel, though very irregular, range which borders the entire extent of the western and southern coasts of Northern Greece, from the Acroceraurian promontory to the Isthmus of Corinth. These vallies, although separated from each other by some difficult passes, constitute a natural chain of communication from Macedonia and Illyricum, as far as the coast at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf. Proceeding from north to south, these vallies are as follows—the maritime plain in which were the ancient cities of Dyrrhachium and Apollonia—the plain of *Kórytza*—the valleys of the branches of the Aous above the Fauces Antigonnenses, containing the modern towns of *Premédi*, *Arghyró-kastro*, and *Kónitza*—the plains of *Ioannina*—of *Arta*—and of *Vrakhóri*. The last of these, which lies below the ruins of Stratus and Thermus, and contains the Lake Trichonis, is

watered on the western side by the *Aspro*, anciently the Achelous. It is separated only by an abrupt ridge from the narrow maritime district of Calydon, in which is the modern *Mesolonghi*, and by a similar barrier from that of Naupactus, which is still a fortified town and harbour, called *Épakto* by the Greeks and *Lepanto* by the Italians. The most remarkable interruption in this line of communication through Western Greece is caused by the Ambracic gulf, which divides Epirus from Acarnania; at its eastern extremity rises a steep woody mountain, now called *Makrinóro*, which formerly separated Amphiloehia from the Ambraciotis, and which constitutes a pass of great strength and importance, corresponding to that of Thermopylæ at the eastern end of the Cætan range; for these mountains, as we have already remarked, stretch quite across the great isthmus lying between the Maliac and Ambracic gulfs; and, as they form a continuous mass with Pindus, as well as with the mountains on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulf, they complete the barrier between Eastern and Western Greece, and render the communication between them in every part a military operation of extreme difficulty.

As long, however, as the Turks possess the fortified towns of Patræ and Naupactus, and the castles on the Capes Rhium and Antirrhium, they are, by means of an adequate naval force, masters of the navigation of the gulf of Corinth, and may transport across it any troops collected on the Ætolian shore opposite to Patræ or on any part of the northern coast of the gulf, for the purpose of co-operating with an army destined to enter the Peloponnesus from Eastern Greece by the Isthmus.

This great advantage formed the basis of the plan of campaign arranged at Constantinople for the year 1822. The recent conquest of *Ioannina* had placed in the hands of the Turks the strongest and most important point in Western Greece; *Prévyza* gave them a ready communication with their fleet, *Arta* the command of the whole level on the northern side of the Ambracic gulf; while *Vónitza** assured to them a safe pas-

* *Arta*, the ancient Ambracia, stands on a strong height in the midst of one of the most fertile plains in Greece, on the left bank of the Arachthus, about six miles from the mouth of that river in the Ambracic gulf, now called the gulf of *Arta*. *Prévyza* is in the district of Nicopolis; it is situated over

sage into Acarnania. At these points it was hoped that an army of Albanians would speedily be collected, sufficient to reduce the whole country as far as the entrance of the gulf of Corinth, before the army of Eastern Greece could arrive at the Isthmus. Meantime the fleet of the Capitan Pasha was to collect troops from the coast of Asia, and to proceed to Nauplia, which had been invested during the whole winter by the Greeks; after having relieved that place and opened a naval communication with the army of Eastern Greece, which it was calculated would by that time have entered the *Moréa*, the fleet was to proceed to Patræ, where they were to debark another body of troops, and then to transport into the *Moréa* the forces of Albania and Western Greece, which, after quelling the insurrection in Acarnania and Ætolia, were to be collected on

against the site of Actium, on a peninsula on the northern side of the narrow strait which leads from the Ionian Sea into the bay of Anactorium. A second strait unites the bay of Anactorium with that beautiful little inland sea, the Ambracic gulf. *Vónitza* is situated in the district of Anactorium, but within the second strait at the south western extremity of the Ambracic gulf. Of these three important places, *Prévryza*, which was fortified by Aly Pasha, is the only one of any strength.

the opposite coast by the pashas of *Ioannina* and *Épakto*.

The particular circumstances, which deranged the Turkish plan of operations, were, 1. the continuance of the war in Epirus. The Suliotes, who had been replaced in possession of their impregnable castle by Aly Pasha, encouraged a spirit of insurrection among the Christian inhabitants of the mountains surrounding the plains of *Ioannina* and *Arta*, which, by alarming the Turks for their communication through the passes separating these two plains, confined their attention to the northern side of the Ambracic gulf, and gave time to their adversaries to prepare for making head against them. Mavrokordáto, president of the Greek Executive Council, finding that all the real power in the *Moréa* was in the hands of the military chiefs, and sensible that the peninsula could hardly be saved, unless the war were maintained in Western Greece, persuaded his colleagues to consent to his assuming the chief direction of affairs in this quarter, where he had already acquired some experience and influence in the preceding year, while Aly was defending himself in *Ioannina*. His views were chiefly directed to the *Armatolí* of the great tract of moun-

tains lying between Thessaly and the south-western coast, who form the chief strength of the insurrection in Greece beyond the Isthmus, as well as to the great defensive resources which the nature of that country affords against an enemy from Epirus. He derived some ultimate hopes also from the effects of that doubtful attachment to the Porte, and from those divisions between the Mohammedans and Christians in Albania, which would probably increase as the contest proceeded.

Mavrokordáto arrived at *Mesolonghi* in May with a corps of European foreigners, about 100 in number, styled *Filéllenes*,—a Greek regiment called regular, of 600 men, commanded by a Piedmontese, a small body of Suliotes under Marko Bótzari, and a few other *Armatolí*. His first object was the relief of *Suli*, in which he was assisted by a body of *Maniátes* under the brother of *Mavromikháli*, who were landed at Port *Fanári* near *Parga*, the ancient *Glykys Limen*. But *Mavrokordáto*, having been ill seconded by some of the chieftains of Western Greece, had only collected 2000 men, when, after having crossed *Ætolia*, *Acarmania*, and *Amphilochia*, he took post at *Kombóti*, near the opening from the pass of *Makrinóro* into the plain of *Arta*. From this posi-

tion, in which the Greeks successfully resisted some attacks from the Turkish cavalry, they proceeded to *Peta*, a strong hill near *Arta*, to which there is only one access from the plain, and which being connected with the mountains separating the Ambraciotis from the Molossic plains which surround the modern *Ioannina*, furnished the readiest means of cutting off the intercourse of the enemy through the strong passes on the road from *Arta* to *Ioannina*, as well as of establishing a communication with *Suli*. But a check which Bótzari received in his advance towards *Suli*, and the treachery of a captain of Armatolí from Athamania,* to whom the key of the position of *Peta* was entrusted, ruined all their hopes. In the midst of a general attack from the Turco-Albanian forces at *Arta*, this coward or traitor fled to the mountains and left the Filéllenes, after a gallant resistance, to be cut to pieces or taken prisoners by the Turks. About the same time the entrance of the Turkish army into the *Moréa* and the arrival of the Capitan Pasha's fleet on the

* The Athamanes, one of the Ἠπειρώτικα ἔθνη, occupied the vallies of the Arachthus, and the mountainous country lying between the Ambraciotis and the great summits of Pindus to the N.E.

western coast of Greece having given the worst aspect to the success of the insurrection, Mavrokordáto was obliged to abandon, for the present, all attempts to the north of the Ambraciac gulf. It was not long before the news of the result of the invasion of the peninsula by land, together with the retreat of the Turkish fleet from the western coast, restored some hopes to the cause in Western Greece; but the leader of the Maniátes having been slain near Suli, and the Suliotes having been reduced to the utmost distress, they were under the necessity in September of accepting the British mediation, and, giving up the castle of Kiáfa to the enemy, they were transported to Kefalonía. Mavrokordáto preserved for some time his positions in Acarnania; but the defection of another of the captains of Armatolí obliged him at length to give up all the country westward of the Achelous; and in the beginning of November, after some attempts to defend the strong approaches to the Ætolian lagoons, his followers were invested by land and sea in the peninsula of *Mesolonghi* and in the island of *Anatolikó*, whose inhabitants retired into the adjacent islands or the Peloponnesus. These places were inaccessible from the sea except by shallow boats; on the

land side the isthmus of *Mesolonghi* was defended by a single low wall and a ditch. To this the besieged added an interior intrenchment, connecting two churches; their artillery amounted to five or six small pieces, and there were not 500 fighting men in the place. Notwithstanding this wretched state of preparation, they resisted for a fortnight the attempts of a large body of Osmanlys under Reshid Pasha, the fire of several 24 pounders and howitzers, and the more formidable activity of the Albanians, in the service of Omér Pasha of *Ioannina*, when some Greek ships, having raised the naval blockade, and brought reinforcements and supplies from the Peloponnesus, the patience of the Osmanlys became exhausted, and hostilities were less actively pursued. After the failure of a general attack, for which the Turks chose as usual a Greek festival, (the night of Christmas or of the 5th of January, 1823,) the intelligence which the besiegers received, of a large body of the Moreites, under Mavromikháli, having landed in Acarnania, alarmed them so much for their retreat across that province, threatened as they already were by the Armatolí, collected on all the mountains in their rear, that they made a sudden retreat through the passes of

Mount *Zygós* to *Vrakhóri*, leaving ten or twelve pieces of cannon and a great part of their camp in the hands of the enemy. The Turkish cavalry saved the infantry from being attacked in the plains; but the wintry terrors of the Achelous, and an enemy hanging upon them on every side, exposed the Albanians to considerable loss in their retreat through Acarnania, and Omér Pasha reached *Vónitza* with a very small number of followers.

2. The second immediate cause of the failure of the Turks in the campaign of 1822, was the insurrection of Chios, which was excited by a small party in that island in conjunction with the Samians. Although nothing could be more imprudent than this enterprize, or more contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the numerous inhabitants; for the island, at the same time that it owed its prosperity to its commerce with Asia and Constantinople, had no adequate means of defence against the fleet or the Turks of the adjacent coast of Ionia—although the rash and cruel attempt was in its consequences so disastrous to the peaceful community, that it would be difficult to find the parallel of their sufferings any where but in ancient history; the event, it must be con-

pressed, was extremely useful to the cause of Grecian independence, by rendering accommodation more difficult, and by adding to the other motives of exertion a general conviction among the Greeks, that there was no safety but in the success of their arms. It was fatal to the Turkish plan of campaign, by detaining the fleet and the Asiatic troops on the coast of Asia; thus preventing their intended co-operation with the armies in Eastern and Western Greece: at the same time that it led to another event of great importance, which, besides causing further delay, tended powerfully to establish the character and confidence of the Greek islanders. On the 18th of June two boats, manned by some seaman of *Psarú* entered the canal of Chios with two fire-vessels, which at night they attached to the two largest ships of the Turks. One of these escaped without much damage, but the admiral's ship was burnt, and the Capitan Pasha himself was killed by the fall of a mast in endeavouring to reach the shore with the very small portion of the ship's company which escaped destruction. So great was the effect of this exploit, in confirming the fears which the Turks already entertained of the Greek fire-ships, that they did

not dare to venture into the narrow extremity of the Argolic gulf, either in proceeding to Patræ or in returning from thence, although in the former instance the success of their army, which was then entering the *Moréa*, depended upon it, and in the latter case the saving of the fortress of Nauplia from capture.

3. A third cause which prevented the Turks from executing a combination of operations in this campaign, was the impossibility of maintaining a constant communication between Eastern and Western Greece, through the mountain-barrier which separates them. The most frequented passage is that which takes its name from the modern town of *Métzovo*. It crosses a central ridge of Pindus, on one side of which are the fountains of the Arachthus, flowing into the Ambracic gulf, and on the other those of the Peneus, which, after traversing the Thessalian plains, flow through the pass of Tempe into the gulf of Thessalonica. This road, in crossing the mountain from west to east, quits the Molossic plain near *Ioannina*, and on the opposite side of Pindus descends upon the site of *Æginium*, now occupied by the town of *Staghí*, or *Kalabáka*, situated on the edge of

the plain of Upper Thessaly, which formerly contained Tricca, Gomphi, and some other large cities. Although the easiest of all the passes, which communicate between Eastern and Western Greece, this route presents great resources for defence, and although free from danger as long as the castle of *Ioannina* and the person of Aly were the main objects of the Porte, it was frequently interrupted by the Armatolí from the country of the ancient Æthices, Athamanes, and other rude tribes of Epirus and Mount Pindus, after the war had become more general, and the insurrection of the Greeks had assumed a consistency. The passes lying farther south, which lead from the plain of Upper Thessaly through Athamania, into the Ambraciotis, or through Dolopia and the Ætolian mountains into the plains bordering upon the lower part of the Achelous, were still less practicable. In the course of the summer, a large body of Turkish cavalry was severely punished for their rash attempt to penetrate in the former direction to *Arta*, through the defiles leading from the site of Gomphi. The Turks were met by a body of Armatolí at the bridge of *Korúki*, on the Achelous, and were so completely defeated, that

it was with difficulty that a small part of them effected a retreat into the Thessalian plain.*

Thus, by the effect of these several causes, the main body of the Ottoman army assembled in the plain of Larissa, was left to its own unassisted exertions in its attack upon the Peloponnesus by the way of the Isthmus.

It was towards the end of May, 1822, that Khurshid Pasha, having failed in some attempts on *Suli*, and having finally resigned the conduct of the war in Western Greece into the hands of the Albanian Omér, now Pasha of *Ioannina*, joined the army at Larissa in Thessaly. His forces were principally collected from Rumili. There were about thirty thousand troops of the Porte, more than a third of whom were cavalry; and there were ten or twelve thousand horse of the Ayans, or great feudatories of Rumili, besides the personal guards of the respective pashas.†

* In the year B.C. 189, Philip, son of Demetrius, King of Macedonia, followed the same route in his expedition against Amynder, King of the Athamans: he met with equal difficulties, and the result was exactly similar. See Livy, l. xxxviii. c. 2.

† It is so extremely difficult to arrive at numerical accuracy in Turkey that we have seldom ventured to state the numbers

The month of June had entirely elapsed before the preparations for advancing beyond the Spercheius were considered by Khurshid as complete.

No sooner had he given the order for advancing, than the cavalry which formed the largest, or at least by far the most efficient, part of his army, leaving the artillery and infantry far behind, crossed the ridges of Othrys and Cæta without opposition. The former was hardly defensible, as the important points of Pharsalus, Thaumaci and Lamia were in the hands of the Turks; but it was expected that Thermopylæ and the passes of Mounts Callidromus and Cnemis, which were then occupied by Odhysséfs (Ulysses) son of Andrisko, a native of the neighbouring Doris, who had been captain of the Armatolí of all this part of the country under Aly Pasha, and who had so successfully opposed a large army of Turks at the same spot in the preceding year, would have presented a vigorous resistance. Whether the inactivity of Od-

on either side in this war. The present estimate rests on the authority of a physician in the service of Khurshid, who was present when the Pasha stationed himself with the other Turkish leaders for three days on the side of the bridge of the Spercheius, near Thermopylæ, while the army defiled over the bridge.

hysséfs on this occasion arose from a spirit of opposition to the central government, with which he had had some recent disagreement, or whether he calculated, that by allowing the enemy to spread over a larger tract of country, the Greeks would have it in their power to intercept his communications, and to harass him in detail with better effect, for which object the nature of the country and other circumstances were so admirably adapted, is perhaps known only to Odhysséfs himself. His courage and ability had hitherto been eminently useful to the cause of his country. He soon afterwards opposed Khurshid himself at the head of the reserve of the Turkish army with success; he has since repeatedly shown how formidable a barrier to the South of Greece, the *Ætæan* passes are in his hands: and whatever may have been his motives upon this occasion, the consequences of his conduct, although at first alarming, were ultimately most beneficial to the Greeks.

The Turkish army having crossed Phocis and Bœotia, plundering, burning, and murdering, while they published the amnesty of the Porte, arrived at Corinth, without having met with any resistance in the mountainous barriers of the

Megaris—and this proof of discord or debility in the Greek councils was followed by another still stronger in the surrender of the Acro-Corinthus, which the Greeks had neglected, or, to speak more justly perhaps, had been unable, from a want of means, to supply with ammunition, engineers, or provisions.

Elated by such an important capture, the Turks advanced in full security to occupy the Argolic plain, and to open a communication with the garrison of Nauplia which had already, in the end of June, agreed to deliver up the place if they should not be relieved in forty days.*

As soon as the enemy entered the Argolis, the Greek government gave up the entire management

* A few days earlier, the Acropolis of Athens had surrendered to the Greeks, after a siege protracted to a great length by the want of means on the part of the besiegers. After the surrender, when the Turks were waiting the arrival of European vessels to transport them into Asia, according to the terms of the capitulation, the Athenians, or their allies, alarmed at the approach of the Turkish army, attacked their prisoners in violation of their engagements, and put about half of them to death. The Athenians then took refuge for a second time in Salamis. It ought perhaps to be mentioned, as some palliation for this inhuman and faithless act, that the Greeks of Athens had been cruelly persecuted by the Turks, when Omér Vrioni occupied Athens in the preceding autumn.

of the contest to Demetrius Ypsilanti, to Mavromikháli and Kolokotróni, and embarked on board their ships in the Argolic gulf. Ypsilanti with a small force occupied the ruined castle which stands on the site of Larissa, the ancient citadel of Argos. The two other leaders collected together the Armatolí of the Peloponnesus.

The Turkish army was commanded by Mehmet Pasha of *Drama* (the ancient Drabescus) in Macedonia, who occupied all the eastern part of the Argolic plain with his troops, and entered Nauplia. Here ended his progress. In vain he looked for the Turkish fleet, as well to furnish the supplies which the devoured country around and in his rear could no longer afford, as to assist his movements by the debarkation of a body of troops on the Lernæan side of the plain of Argos, without which operation on the enemy's flank he soon perceived that it would be difficult for him to penetrate any farther into the peninsula; for besides the defensive resources which the Greeks found in the town of Argos, there was a still stronger position in their rear behind the Erasinus, a river which, issuing from under a steep mountain, connected with the ridges of Arcadia, which were then occupied by the Greeks, crosses a marshy plain to the

sea near Lerne: beyond this important line of defence again were the rugged passes of Hysiaë and Mount Parthenium, which separate the Argolic plain from the Tegeatis or plain of *Tripolitza*.

Without cavalry, artillery, or much concert among themselves, the Greeks maintained their ground for several days in the ruined houses of Argos, or in the vineyards along the banks of the Inachus, where they protected themselves against the Turkish cavalry behind entrenchments and excavations. When driven out of these positions by the fire of the Turkish artillery, to which they had nothing of the same kind to oppose, they still maintained a successful resistance on the Erasinus, and behind the rocks and ruined walls of the hill of Larissa.

While every day increased their numbers in the surrounding mountains, a total want of provisions for men and horses soon rendered it impossible for the Turkish commander to continue in his position, or any longer to delay his retreat into the Corinthia. There is no outlet from the plain of Argos in the direction of Corinth, but through the passes of *Barbáti* and *Dervenáki*, which lead from either side of the ancient Mycenæ into the valley of

Cleonæ, and from thence through another pass into the maritime plain which includes Sicyon, Corinth, and the Isthmus. Some of the Turks effected their retreat towards Corinth, and one body threw themselves under the protection of the guns of Nauplia, but the greater part fell victims, on the 6th and 7th of August, to their own indiscipline, and to the improvidence and rashness of their leader, in the passes of Tretus and Mount Eubœa, on either side of the ruins of Mycenæ, where a Grecian imagination might picture the ghosts of the Atridæ witnessing, from their still existing sepulchres, a slaughter of the barbarian hosts, from which Greece may perhaps date her resurrection from slavery; for, in fact, this was the most important event that had yet occurred during the contest.

On the 18th and 19th August, the Ottoman commander, after having received reinforcements and pressing orders from the Seraskier, made attempts to regain the Argolis; but the Greeks having occupied the passes of the Corinthia in their rear, as well as having resisted them in front, they were at last obliged to fight for a safe retreat into the plain of Corinth.

In the meantime the Greek senate had sent some

ships round to the port of Cenchreæ to occupy the Isthmus, and Odhysséfs had filled the barriers of the Megaris with his Armatolí, so that the Turks, defeated as they were, had no longer any retreat from their positions at Nauplia and Corinth. They were sufficiently strong, however, to maintain themselves in these two places during the autumn, and it required all the vigilance of Kolo-kotróni to prevent their communication. At length, on the night of the 12th of December, the garrison of the *Palamídhí*, or upper fort of Nauplia, reduced to despair by famine, quitted that post, and retired into the lower fortress, when the Greeks, who were investing the place, having perceived what had happened, occupied the *Palamídhí*, and the garrison of the town surrendered upon condition of being transported in safety into Asia.

This was the most valuable capture the insurgents had yet made, as, together with a harbour in the most convenient of all situations for an intercourse between the peninsula and the islands, it gave them the fortifications and public buildings erected here at a vast expense by the Venetians, when they made this place the seat of their government in the *Moréa*. Another event of still greater benefit perhaps to the Greek cause, which

occurred about the same time, was an order issued by the British government to their officers in the Mediterranean acknowledging the right of the Greeks to blockade the ports of Greece which remained in possession of the Turks. Though adopted in conformity with the observance on the part of Great Britain of a strict neutrality between the two contending parties, it was regarded by the Greeks as a first step to the recognition of their independence in the most important of all quarters, at the same time that, by giving them a prospect of depriving the Turkish garrisons of a great part of those supplies which had been a very profitable object of speculation to some persons in the Ionian islands and elsewhere, it afforded them a hope of effecting such a blockade as might lead to the reduction of the enemy's fortresses in the Peloponnesus, in the only manner which the want of military resources seemed as yet to admit of.

The remaining operations of the Turkish fleet in the campaign of 1822 were still more inglorious than those which have been related. The Porte entertained hopes that, notwithstanding the long detention of the fleet on the coast of Asia, its co-operation might still be useful in the *Moréa*. Without making any attempt to relieve Nauplia,

the fleet proceeded to Patræ, took on board at that place the officer who was appointed to fill the post of Capitan Pasha, disembarked a small body of troops, but entirely failed in the main object of the expedition. The insurrection in Western Greece, although not very successful, had been sufficient to occupy all the Albanian and Ottoman forces collected in that quarter. The new admiral was unable even to effect a communication through Achaia with the army of Eastern Greece in the Argolis; and that army was defeated, and its remains, in two separate bodies, had taken shelter under the guns of Nauplia and Corinth, before the admiral had sailed from Patræ for the eastern coast of the peninsula. It is obvious that the march of the army ought to have been arrested so soon as it was known that a delay had occurred in the departure of the fleet from the Asiatic coast: but once set in motion its progress could no longer be stopt; the troops had been carried forward by the necessity of seeking new supplies, until they were collected in the Argolis without the power of advancing, and long before the fleet, destined as it was to make a previous visit to Patræ, could possibly reach the Argolic gulf. It was not until September, when little was left for the fleet to perform but the

relief of Nauplia, that it arrived near *Spetzia* at the entrance of the Argolic gulf, where it was met by a great number of the insurgent vessels. The Greeks, unable to use their fire-ships in the open sea, did not venture to approach the heavy artillery of the Turks, who, on their part, would not expose themselves to the Greek fire-ships in the narrow extremity of the gulf near Nauplia. Instead of entering it, therefore, the Turkish admiral sent in two vessels, which were intercepted by the enemy before they could reach Nauplia: he then sailed to Crete, and from thence to Tenedos, where in the middle of November he was attacked at anchor by the same enterprising Psarian, Constantine Kanáris, who had burnt the former Capitan Pasha's ship at Chios, and with similar success. On this occasion, however, it was the Capitan Pasha who escaped and his comrade who suffered. After some further losses from the weather, the remaining Turkish vessels sought safety in the Dardanelles, and thus ignominiously closed the naval campaign of 1822.

The second congress which met at *Astró*, in the ancient Thyreatis, on the maritime frontier of Argolis and Laconia, in the month of April, 1823, found that a year had made a great increase in

public confidence and in the extent of the insurrection, while the recent advantages obtained over the enemy gave the best hopes for the future. Their military position in general, however, was nearly the same as in the preceding year. The Turks were still in possession of all the fortresses of the *Moréa* except two, with just so much of the level country of Northern Greece as their posts at Larissa, Lamia, and the Euripus could command. In other respects their embarrassments were increasing: the Porte found great difficulty in equipping its fleet, and had resorted to such violent measures for sustaining its finances, that the piastre, which not many years before had been equivalent to an English shilling, was now reduced to the forty-fifth part of the pound sterling.

But, on the other hand, the wealth of the commercial islands and towns of Greece were equally exhausted by the exertions which had been made since the beginning of the contest; some of the powers of continental Europe continued to regard the insurrection as part of a general conspiracy against established governments; the others refused all countenance to the insurgents; and individual charity was very inadequate to supply the wants of a people in the situation of the Greeks.

Hence they were unable to retain in their service or to satisfy even the most moderate expectations of the numerous military men of experience, who had been left in idleness in every part of Europe by the general peace, and who were anxious for employment in Greece. They were unable even to take into the service of government their own private ships by which all their naval efforts had been made, or to execute the repairs of a two years war for them: so that the number of those ships in a state to oppose the enemy was considerably diminished. Still less could they organize an artillery or create a corps of infantry under the orders and in the pay of the executive, without which it was impossible for the government to follow any improved plan of military operations, or even to establish a national treasury, collect the taxes, and administer, for the benefit of the revenue, all that large portion of the property of the insurgent districts, which, having formerly belonged to the Turks or their government, was now confiscated to the state.

A government without a treasury, a marine, or an army, was of course little better than a cypher: nor was it in the power of the deputies assembled at *Astró* to confer the authority that was wanted.

The acts of this Congress, therefore, were little more than a repetition or revisal of those of the preceding year. They once more issued a formal assertion of independence, made some amendments in the provisional constitution, and again authorized the executive to borrow money upon the security of the public revenue. The collecting of the contributions in every part of Greece, except the islands, and with it all real power, still remained in the hands of the illiterate chieftains of the land forces, who, though brave and sincere in the cause, were too ignorant to see the necessity of giving way to others for the general advantage: some of them feeling no inclination to submit to an abridgment of their power or their profits, and all of them being naturally more disposed to trust to themselves for obtaining the resources necessary to keep their followers together, than to a government in which they could not possibly have any great confidence. And thus the Congress, although, by the numerous attendance of deputies, it furnished an useful evidence of the improvement of the cause of independence in extent, consistency, and unanimity of purpose, left the affairs of the country in the same

anarchical state in which it had found them. The two military chiefs of greatest influence, Mavromikháli and Kolokotróni were made President and Vice-President of the ἐκτελεστικόν or Executive Council, and having thus both the civil and military powers in their hands, they reduced the senate, or βουλευτικὸν σῶμα, to total imbecility. The latter attempted, indeed, to preserve its authority, and was engaged during the remainder of the year in endeavouring to check the abuses of the military government; but two successive presidents, Kundurióti and Mavrokordáto, having fled to *Ydra*, the remaining members, after frustrating an attempt of the party of Kolokotróni to seize the archives of the senate at Argos, retired to *Kranídhí*, at the extremity of the Argolic peninsula, near *Spetzia*. Here they speedily elected a new executive, at the head of which was placed the Ydriote Kundurióti. And thus the party of the naval, or insular leaders of the insurrection, was in open hostility with that composed of the military chieftans and of some of the primates of the Peloponnesus. Nothing can more strongly show the perfect similarity of the modern Greek character with that of the ancient people, than these dissensions in the midst of the most immi-

nent danger; and that they have not interrupted a spirited defensive resistance to the enemies of their national independence and religion.

As the military situation of the two parties had not materially altered, the Ottoman plan of campaign was nearly the same as in the former year, and the chief difficulty in its execution was again caused by the immense strength of the country. As before, the great object of the Porte was to effect a simultaneous attack upon the northern coast of the *Moréa* from Eastern and from Western Greece, by means of their fleet and of the positions which the Turkish forces preserved at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth. But it was proposed in 1823, to make the maritime command of the gulf more useful, and to establish a better concert of operations between Eastern and Western Greece. Instead of a sudden incursion into the Peloponnesus, the Ottoman forces were not to attempt the passes of Cithæron and the Megaris until they had pushed forward detachments from the Bœoto-Phocic plains to occupy the bays of Crissa and Anticyra (now called the bays of *Galaxídhí* and *Aspraspítia*), and the port of Creusis (*Livadostro*). A large corps of Albanians under Mustafá Pasha of Scodra was to as-

semble at Tricca, now called *Trikkala*, with the view of effecting a junction in the plain of the Achelous with the other Albanian forces collected at *Arta* and *Prévyza* under Omér Pasha of *Ioannina*, and after having taken or masqued *Mesolonghi* they were to cross over into the *Moréa*, reinforced by the Asiatic troops which were to be brought to *Patræ* by the Capitan Pasha's fleet. The part of the army of Eastern Greece which was to be assembled in the ports on the northern shore of the Corinthian gulf, was to be transported across the gulf into Achaia, and to clear the road along the Achaian coast, where, as the land rises immediately from the shore into high mountains, connected with those of Arcadia, it is difficult to maintain an uninterrupted communication by land from *Patræ* to Corinth without a large force.* The united army would then raise the blockade of the Acrocorinthus, and would be in readiness to act in concert with the remainder of the army

* The division of the Turkish army which retreated to Corinth after the defeat in Argolis, in August, 1822, attempted, after the fall of Nauplia in the ensuing January, to make their way to *Patræ*, but were met by the Armatoli of Nikita and some other chiefs in the maritime passes of *Ægeira* and *Ægæ*, and, with the exception of a party of Albanians, who capitulated upon conditions, were all either slain or made prisoners.

of Eastern Greece, collected in the plains of Bœotia; the Megaric barriers of the Isthmus would be simultaneously assailed on both sides, and a junction would be effected without any loss. It was undoubtedly an improvement upon the plan of the preceding year. To the Albanians, who are alone fitted to contend with the Greeks in their native mountains, was left the difficult task of subduing Acarnania and Ætolia, while the main Osmanly army, assembled in the eastern plains of Thessaly, reinforced by a corps which was to be landed by the Capitan Pasha at the Euripus before he sailed for Patræ, would, it was calculated, occupy without difficulty, all the country to the foot of Mount Cithæron.

But the defects in the Turkish system, which have already been developed to the reader, were more than sufficient to render totally unsuccessful a plan, the complete success of which would have required a much larger army than the Porte has for many years been able to collect, together with an accuracy of combination which none but the most efficient government can command. In the naval department the Ottomans received more effectual succour than in the preceding year, from the Barbary States, especially the Algerines,

whose ships and seamen were much better adapted than their own to contend with the Greeks; the latter being, moreover, as we have already observed, less strong at sea than they had been in the two former years. With all his exertions, however, the Capitan Pasha was unable to reach Patræ before midsummer, after having effected a junction with the Barbary squadron in the month of April, after having detached reinforcements to Crete, and landed supplies at Volo,* as well as at the fortresses of *Kárysto* and *Égripo* in Eubœa, and of *Koróni* and *Mothóni* in Messenia.

The insurrection, which had now become very formidable along the range of Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, and Othrys, threatened the rear of the Turkish Army in Thessaly too much to admit of a large force being sent into Bœotia, until Pelion, at least, had been reduced. That mountain being the most formidable position of the insurgents, from its numerous population, its peninsular strength, its easy communication with the Greek naval forces, and its central situation in the chain of the eastern range of mountains, was very judi-

* A Turkish castle situated in the plain at the head of the Pelasgic gulf, between the sites of Pagasæ and Demetrias.

ciously the chief object of the Turkish commander ; but the town of *Tríkhirí* and the promontory of Mount Tisæum on which it is situated, on the eastern side of the entrance into the Pelasgic gulf, affords such an excellent point of retreat to the Magnesians, that the Turks, although they obtained some temporary success, were unable to produce any such result as could materially assist the general plan of the campaign.

In like manner, although a body of Ottoman troops from Thessaly, joining that of Eubœa, overran Bœotia and Attica, and even entered the town (but not the citadel) of Athens, the Armatolí of Odhysséfs, and other chieftains, were sufficient to prevent them from approaching the Isthmús, or even from occupying any of the ports on the shore of the Corinthian gulf, having made them pay dearly for all their attempts to penetrate through the strong passes of Helicon and Parnassus.

In the autumn the Turks found themselves under the necessity of withdrawing a part of their forces into Thessaly, while with the remainder they cruelly persecuted and plundered the inhabitants of Eubœa, who the less deserved it, as

they had hitherto been slow in joining the insurrection. The Osmanlys, however, were soon followed into this island by Odhysséfs, who having been speedily joined by some of the Armatolí of the Thessalian mountains, and assisted by reinforcements landed from the Greek fleet, forced the enemy before the winter to retreat behind the walls of Carystus, and of the Euripus.

In Western Greece the Armatolí of the great continuous ranges of Pindus and Cæta, under Sturnári, Ysko, and other experienced captains, maintained a communication across the continent from Epirus to Mount Pelion and Eubœa, in spite of their formidable Albanian opponents, who occupied the country around Tricca. Several partial endeavours were made to penetrate the Greek line of defence during the early summer, but it was not until the arrival in the month of July of Mustafá Pasha of Scodra, (for upon this modern Gentius and his Illyrians all the remaining hopes of the Porte for the campaign now rested,) that a serious attempt was made to effect the object of passing from the plains of Upper Thessaly through the Dolopian and Ætolian mountains into the plain of *Vrakhóri*, for the purpose of there effecting a junction with the troops

of Western Greece which were collected in the districts of Ambracia and Anactorium.

The Porte, always justly doubtful of the fidelity of the Albanians, had given the direction of the latter part of the expedition, that which was collected in the Ambracic gulf, to the Osmanly Yussuf, of *Serres* (Sirræ) in Macedonia, commander of the Turkish positions and forces at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth; a preference which gave so much offence, as well as alarm, perhaps, for his own head to the Albanian Omér Pasha, that he is supposed to have encouraged the defection of a large body of Albanians, which took place at *Vónitza* in the beginning of August, at the moment when Yussuf was about to march from thence with his army through the passes of Acarnania. The Albanian deserters passed round the gulf and through the *Makrinóro*, without any molestation from the Greeks, with whom they were probably in correspondence, and Yussuf Pasha was so much alarmed at the event, that he immediately returned to Patræ, leaving the prosecution of affairs in Acarnania in the hands of Omér.

Not long afterwards the army of the Scodrian met with a disaster of a different kind. Having

crossed the ridge of *Agrafa*, and taken post near *Karpenísi*, a town situated at the foot of Mount *Velúkhi*, (the ancient Tymphrestus, which separates the waters running to the Spercheius from those which form a branch of the Achelous,) they were attacked by the Greeks in the night of the 21st of August and defeated with great slaughter, and the subsequent plunder of their camp. The numerical loss of the Greeks was very trifling, but the victory was dearly bought with the life of the heroic Marko Bótzari, who had penetrated with a chosen body of Suliotes into the centre of the enemy's position. Notwithstanding these checks, however, the two Albanian leaders succeeded in surmounting all the efforts of the Armatolí to oppose them in the passes of the Ætolian and Acarnanian mountains, and having at length, in the end of September, effected a junction in the Ætolian plain on the left bank of the Achelous, they speedily established a communication with Patræ, Naupactus, and the squadron which had been left on the coast by the Capitan Pasha on his departure for the Ægæan. They then penetrated through the passes of the lake Trichonis, and the defiles of Mount Aracynthus, which form the last of the strong defences of

the maritime plains and lagoons lying between the Achelous and Evenus, and *Mesolonghi* was once more threatened with a siege. But the failure of every other part of the plan of campaign rendered fruitless the exertions of the two Albanian chiefs; the Ottoman forces had retreated from Bœotia into Thessaly and Eubœa, and the Acro-Corinthus surrendered to the Greeks in the middle of October; Mustafá of Scodra, therefore, after having ineffectually bombarded *Anatolikó*, and made an unsuccessful attempt to convey troops into that island in boats, began his retreat in November towards the north of Albania; Omér Pasha once more retired to his positions on the Ambracic gulf: and Mavrokordáto returning, about the same time, to his government with a small squadron from Hydra and Spetzia, *Mesolonghi* was relieved for the present from its naval blockade.

The Turkish admiral, in returning to the Hellespont, was met, at the end of September, near Mount Athos, and again at Sciathus, by Miaoúlis the Ydriote, with a squadron of Greek ships, and sustained some damage, together with the loss of one of his small ships of war. A convoy proceeding from Thessalonica to the Euripus was about

the same time attacked by the Greeks, and suffered great loss, in the bay of Opus on the Locrian coast. But the Turks had avoided any disasters such as those of the preceding year, by leaving their great ships at home, and by trusting chiefly to frigates, which being more manageable, and offering less temptation to the attack of the enemy's fire-ships, were at the same time too heavily armed to be approached by the small Greek vessels. The Greek navarchs, however, had not been deficient in their usual activity, having effected debarkations on the coasts of Asia Minor and of Macedonia, which, although they exposed the Greeks in the Pergamenian district and in the Macedonian plains to a cruel persecution, were extremely useful to the general cause in Greece; while the former detained the Turkish forces in Asia, the expeditions to the Macedonian coast were equally useful in preventing the Pasha of *Salonika* from reinforcing the army in Thessaly; for it may be here observed, that the advantages which the physical structure of the country has given to the insurrection are in no part of Greece more remarkable than in the great Macedonian or Thracian peninsula of Chalcidice, which terminates in the three small peninsulas of Pallene,

Sithonia, and Acte, or Athos. These strong positions of the insurgents, open to their insular friends by sea, pressed on one side upon the great plains of Lower Macedonia; while on the other there was an insurrection extending through the whole Olympian range as far north as the mountains of Edessa and Pella, so that the Pasha of *Salonika* has from the beginning of the revolution found ample employment for all his disposable force. The Osmanlys, being very strong in his province, had indeed been enabled in November, 1821, to force the intrenched position of the Greeks at Cassandria or Potidæa on the Isthmus of Pallene, and to satisfy their thirst of spoil and vengeance in that Peninsula. They exercised similar cruelties on taking *Naussa*, a town in Mount Bermius on the east of the Olympian ridge between Berrhæa and Edessa in the spring of 1822, but the insurgents, assisted by some of the Armatolî of other parts of Greece, and occasionally by the fleet, were never long prevented from keeping up a resistance along the whole eastern side of Greece, from the extremities of Athos and Pallene, and from the northern frontier of Proper Macedonia through Olympus, Ossa,

and Pelion, to Cæta, Pindus, and the western coast of Greece.

Among the larger islands, Samos and Crete have been the only two seriously engaged in the war. In Crete, the Sfakiotes, like the Maniates of the *Moréa*, formed the basis of the insurrection, and by means of the assistance which they received from the insurgent government, the Cretans were enabled to maintain the war with tolerable success during the two first years, under the Ydriote Tombazi, who was sent to assist them with some ships, and to conduct their operations; but the very large proportion of the Musulman population in this island, aided by the ships and troops sent in two successive summers by the Pasha of Egypt, has lately been too powerful for the declining means of the Greek government; and the Cretan insurgents have now been obliged to retire into the mountains, and a few maritime positions.

The strength of the old Venetian fortresses of *Candia*, *Canea*, *Retymo*, and *Suda*, will probably enable the Turks to maintain those posts as long as the Ottoman fleet can traverse the *Ægæan*, and, perhaps, long after they have lost all the rest of the island.

Samos has from the beginning of the contest set an example to the important islands of the Asiatic coast, which the latter, not containing, like Samos, a population entirely Christian, nor possessing so defensible a country, have shewn little readiness to follow. The Samians, on the contrary, instead of being deterred by their proximity to the Asiatic continent, from which they are separated by a strait only a mile broad in the narrowest part, have taken advantage of this circumstance to make frequent landings in Ionia, and have even extended their ravages to a considerable distance in the valley of the Mæander. These incursions, like those of the Psarians on the coast of Æolis and of the northern part of Ionia, although often disgraced by cruelty, have been a most useful diversion to the cause in Europe, by detaining the Osmanlys in Asia; and hence, from the beginning of the contest, it has been considered an object of the first necessity with the Turks to effect the reduction of Samos and *Psará*. Several ineffectual attempts have been made against Samos; and it is the main object of the naval campaign of the present summer to attack in succession all the strong holds of the insurgents in the Ægæan with the allied fleet of the Moham-

medan powers, having on board a numerous body of troops of debarkation, consisting largely of Albanians. The event of these attempts, most formidable, it must be confessed, to such small communities, is not yet known: but it may safely be anticipated, that whatever footing the Turks may gain in the summer will be lost in the ensuing winter; and, moreover, that it will not be obtained without great sacrifices, for it is next to impossible for the Turkish ships to leave their harbours without suffering from the elements, from their own unskilfulness, or from the superior seamanship and enterprise of their opponents. Even when the only object of their summer excursions was to collect the tribute from the islands and *Mani*, they seldom reached Constantinople on their return without having suffered considerable damage from their want of skill alone.

The following is the Turkish plan of campaign by land for the present year (1824)—20,000 Albanians under Mustafá Pasha of Scodra to march through *Ioannina* and *Arta* upon *Mesolónghi*; 10,000 Albanians under Omér Pasha to cross Mount Pindus into Eastern Greece, and to march upon Athens; 20,000 men under Dervish Pasha to march from Larissa by *Zitúni* upon

Sáloná (Amphissa) and the Crissæan bay of the gulf of Corinth; the army of Yussuf Pasha, commander of the forces at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth, to be reinforced by 10,000 Janissaries, who are to be disembarked there from the fleet of the Capitan Pasha; and finally, the army of Egypt, commanded by Ibrahim Pasha, son of the viceroy Mohammed Aly, to proceed with the Egyptian fleet to the *Moréa*. Thus we have the same intentions as in the preceding year, the same lines of movement, and, with the exception of the Seraskier at Larissa—the same commanders. The only addition is the Egyptian army; and we are told that a formidable expedition against Greece is in preparation at Alexandria. But the Viceroy of Egypt, although, as a Musulman, by no means indifferent to the Sultan's cause, nor so independent as to disregard the consequences of being a declared rebel, cannot consider the Greek war as vitally affecting his interests. It must be admitted that the history of his life proves him to have great ambition as well as talents; and it is impossible to foresee the extent and duration of efforts which depend upon the views or passions of an individual; it may be presumed, however, that he will not easily

part with the best or largest portion of those troops upon whom his own safety depends ; for a Turkish satrap has always an enemy in the Porte, and is never exempt from the apprehensions of treachery and revolt. As to the other parts of the Turkish scheme of operations, it would not be very rash to prognosticate, that so many as 10,000 men will not be collected upon any one of the points of assembly indicated : that Omér Pasha, at once fearful of the Porte, of the Scodrian chieftain, of a formidable rival, who threatens his hereditary possessions in middle Albania, and of the Albanian chieftains in Epirus, who were united with the Greeks in support of Aly, and who have never acted cordially with the Turkish government, will not move far from his own capital ; that if the Greeks in Western Greece are tolerably united, it will be still less in the power of the Scodrian to take *Mesolonghi* than it was in the last year ; and that in Eastern Greece the amount of the Turkish exploits will probably be to overrun the plains of Thessaly and Bœotia with their cavalry, and to devour the harvest, if the desolation of the two preceding years has left any labourers to cultivate the fields.

Having thus laid before the reader a sketch of

the previous condition of the Greeks, together with the leading facts of the insurrection, he will be enabled to exercise his own judgment, on the probabilities of the final result. It has been seen that, while the insurgents have been increasing in confidence and numbers, have obtained some of the fortified places, have caused the destruction of many of the enemy's ships, and have had the superiority over them in the field on some important occasions, the latter have not gained a single advantage, that can serve as a step towards subduing the insurrection. Such has been the termination of a three years' contest between the small vessels of some of the most skilful seamen in the world, against large ships, ill manned, and conducted by ignorance and inexperience—between cavalry and artillery against infantry, in a country peculiarly formed to give importance to the latter.

But if the existence alone of such an insurrection for so long a period as four years is sufficient to prove that it never can be suppressed without foreign assistance; on the other hand, the excessive ignorance of the Greeks in the art of war, their want of union, and their poverty, still leave them far removed from that complete possession of the country, which can alone authorize them to

insist upon an acknowledgment of their independence, either by their Turkish adversaries or by other nations. Before they are qualified to hold this language, they must, above all things, be masters of the fortresses of the *Moréa*. The great importance of Patræ and Naupactus, with the naval command of the gulf of Corinth, which depends upon them, has already been exemplified. The destiny of Eastern Greece is no less dependent upon that of *Égripo*, the only place of strength in the hands of the Turks to the southward of Thessalonica: for *Zitúni* and *Volo* are feeble garrisons, exposed to be cut off by the insurgents in Pelion, Othrys, and Cæta, whenever the Osmanlys are not in force in the plains on either side of them.

Égripo, a corruption of Euripus, occupies the site of the ancient Chalcis, and is connected by a bridge of about 100 feet in length with the Bœotian shore of the strait, from which rises a commanding hill occupied by the Turkish fortress of *Karabába*; and hence it is not sufficient, in order to invest *Égripo*, that the Greeks should have possession of the island of Eubœa, or that they should be able to prevent the Turkish fleet from relieving *Égripo* by sea; they must also be masters of the range

of mountains anciently called Hypatus, Ptoum, Messapium, and Cyrtone, which are united by the chain of Cnemis and Callidromus with Mount Ceta, and which contain the passes leading from the shore of the Euboic strait into the plains of Thebes and of the lake Copais.

If the fortress of the Euripus should be taken, the future incursions of the Turkish cavalry into the country southward of Mount Ceta would be perilous, and could only be transitory; and as the Greeks would then surround the basin of Thessaly in greater force, and would possess themselves of Tempe and of the strong passes of Mount Olympus, which separate Thessaly from Macedonia, it would probably follow, that the Turks, having no place in the former province capable of any resistance, would be under the necessity of retreating into the plains of Lower Macedonia at the head of the Thermaic gulf, unless they could secure their right flank by means of the Albanians. But enough has already been stated to shew, that in consequence of the mutual dislike existing between the Albanians and the Osmanlys, and of the domestic spirit of dissention in Albania, the Porte, although it may continue to employ the mercenary services of the warlike people of that

country in every part of the empire, cannot depend much upon the efforts of Albania, as an united nation, against the Greeks, and that the cause of Grecian independence, at least to the southward of Mount Cæta and the Ambraciac gulf, will not long suffer very seriously from the vicinity of the Albanians. It is probable that Albania will gradually relapse into the barbarous state of internal discord, but national independence, which has been more or less its condition, as far back as we can trace its history; which in times of general danger may unite its discordant districts under the person of greatest influence or military talent, as happened in the war of George Kastrióti of Kroya, (Scanderbeg) against Sultan Mahomet the Second, but which, at other times, leaves its neighbours more to apprehend from individual rapacity or from the incursions of robbers, than from the united strength or ambition of the nation.

As long as the Turks can preserve the Euripus and the fortresses of the *Moréa*, especially those which give them the command of the Corinthian gulf, they will not cease to entertain a hope of regaining their ground in Greece, and they will consequently make every effort to relieve those fortresses by sea and land, as well as to retain the

occupation of the plains of Eastern Greece, without which they are sensible that the Euripus will not long remain in their possession. The Greeks, on the other hand, are equally convinced of the necessity of making some effort to besiege the maritime fortresses, as the prospect of reducing them by famine must be very precarious as long as they have it not in their power to prevent the large ships of the several Musulman powers from occasionally relieving them. Nothing can more strongly shew the inefficiency of the military government of Greece, than that a post so contemptible as the castle of Patræ should have held out for three years after its investment by the Peloponnesian Armatolí. The want of a treasury has hitherto been the insuperable obstacle to improvements in the conduct both of their civil and of their military affairs; but as private liberality, and the still more effectual aid of the loan, which the pecuniary plethora of England has enabled the Greek agents to raise in London, have removed this impediment to melioration, it may be hoped that the execution of the requisite measures will no longer depend upon any ignorant or rapacious chief of Armatolí who may happen to have a large number of followers. The Greek privateers, which have hitherto so

ably prosecuted the naval war, will be taken into the service of the state, and a few vessels of a larger class will be procured: an artillery will be formed, as well as a regular infantry, instructed in the European discipline; and the *Armatolî* may be organized as a provincial militia under the ablest and most trustworthy of their chiefs. *Naupactus* and *Patræ* will probably be reduced, which must be speedily followed by the fall of the castles of *Rhium* and *Antirhium*: the Greeks may then easily keep exclusive possession of the navigation of the gulf of *Corinth*, and they may then, but not before, consider themselves masters of the *Peloponnesus*.

To ensure the safety of their conquest, it would be a most useful measure to form an intrenched camp extending from the *Acro-Corinthus* to *Lechæum*, on the gulf of *Corinth*, and from the same citadel to *Cenchreæ*, on the *Æginetan* gulf. The latter is a line of six miles; but being occupied by a steep wall of rock, rising from the south side of the *Isthmus*, through which there are only two narrow passages, the fortifying of this entrance into the peninsula is not more difficult than that between *Lechæum* and the *Acro-Corinthus*, which is only two miles in breadth. With such a fortifi-

cation; with the Armatolí in possession of the mountains of the Megaris in its front; with all the harbours of the two gulfs of the "bimaris Corinthus" occupied by their vessels, the insurgents, if they continue to preserve the same spirit which has hitherto animated them, will be in a condition to defy the efforts of an enemy, who is unable to take the field or the sea before May, or to keep them beyond October. They will then have the best right not only to treat with their late oppressors on the basis of an acknowledgment of the independence of a large portion of Greece, but even to hope for the assistance of some of the great Christian powers in obtaining it.

Next to the gulf of Corinth that of Ambracia is the naval position of the greatest importance to the Greeks. The command of this mediterranean is of vital utility to their cause, whether for the defence of Ætolia and Acarnania, and under their cover for the protection of the Peloponnesus, or with the more extended view of liberating Epirus from the Musulman yoke. If the Osmanlys were expelled from the gulf of Corinth, the insurgents would be able immediately to turn their attention to that of Ambracia, and would soon oblige the Musulman Albanians to evacuate the castle of

Vónitza. Their future progress would be greatly assisted by building small vessels on the southern shore of the gulf, where the woods and sheltered coves furnish great facilities for such an undertaking; they would then be able to cope with the vessels of the enemy at *Préviza*, where the depth of water prevents any that draw more than twelve feet of water from entering; and they might thus at least be masters of the Ambracian gulf within the strait of Anactorium. For any objects to the northward of the gulf the possession of the fortified and strongly situated post of *Préviza* seems indispensibly necessary, as this place commands the exterior entrance of the gulf, shelters the Turkish vessels from pursuit from the open sea, carries on all the maritime intercourse of the south of Epirus, and is the harbour by which alone the army of the Northern Albanians can maintain a communication with their own ports, and receive their supplies when they advance into Ætolia. The possession of *Préviza* would be an important step to the recovery of *Suli* and the capture of *Arta*, upon which will probably depend the insurrection of the Epiroté Christians, in the populous mountain-districts of *Djumérka*, *Zagóri*, and *Pogóyani*, as well as in those on the western side

of the plains of *Ioannina*. Should the Moslem Albanians be obliged to retreat from *Ioannina* within the frontiers of Proper Albania, and those of the maritime part of Epirus remain neutral, no part of the plains of Thessaly would be any longer tenable by the Osmanlys.

During the last two years the Porte has been sufficiently alive to the difficulties of its situation to try the effects of conciliation with its rebellious subjects. The Turkish admirals have endeavoured to enter into terms with the three islands which form the heart of the insurrection; and the government has made some spirited efforts to punish or suppress the vindictive spirit of their Musulman subjects in those parts of Europe and Asia where the Greeks, regardless of what they have already suffered, or of the example of their more prudent countrymen who have retired to Samos, Crete, and other islands, are, by the small proportion of their numbers, left at the mercy of the Turks.

In the campaign of last year (1823), besides proclaiming an amnesty, the Porte sent several dignitaries of the Greek church to persuade their countrymen to submission: some of these proceeded from the head-quarters of the Seraskier,

in Upper Thessaly, into the neighbouring mountains: others made a similar attempt in the Peloponnesus; it is almost unnecessary to add, without the smallest success. For such must be the result of their negotiations as long as the Turks persist in using the word 'amnesty' only. No one who has a correct idea of the previous condition of the two people, who considers to what an extreme their mutual hostility has now proceeded, or who is aware of the weakness of the Turkish government, and how incapable it is of insuring protection to the Christians, will suppose it possible that the Greeks can trust to any compact with their late rulers but such as shall be guaranteed by their own arms—such as shall liberate them from all dependence upon Turkish faith and Turkish mercy—such as shall exclude the Ottomans from all real authority in Greece.

It might be supposed that the Porte, after the experience of the three past years, would be not unwilling to amputate the deceased limb, lest the malady should spread to more vital parts—lest a cry of liberty, raised by the entire Christian population of European Turkey, should be echoed by that of Syria and Armenia; and that having still so much to fear from her great north-

ern neighbour, she would be inclined to place the Greeks in a condition to be of greater use to her perhaps as allies, than they have ever been as slaves. The Greeks on their side ought to be still more anxious to come to terms, for although it may not be possible for the Turks to reduce the south of Greece to its former state without the assistance of dissensions among the Greeks themselves; yet those dissensions will be greatly promoted by a deficiency of pecuniary means, as the Turks are fully aware. The war has already dissipated all the wealth which a long course of industry had collected; it may be doubted whether Greece has not already arrived at the extent of her credit with other nations; while the power which the united forces of Constantinople and the African states possess of maintaining a naval war from year to year, cannot be met without a continued expense, and may lead to the greatest distress. Let us hope that the glory of putting an end to this cruel contest is reserved for that mediation which has already so successfully diverted the threatened hostilities between Russia and the Porte, thus preserving the general peace of Europe and equally consulting the true interests of Great Britain, and the ultimate advantage of Greece herself.

We shall not detain the reader with any reflections upon the provisional constitution of Greece, proclaimed at Epidaurus on the 15-27th of January, 1822.* It is scarcely possible to reduce these laws to practice in the present state of the country, and the scheme is confessedly only provisional, intended to give place to various amendments when the independence of Greece is confirmed. And this perhaps is a fortunate circumstance; for we cannot compliment the Neo-Hellenic legislators on having adopted the scheme of a quinquepartite executive, which experience has so well shewn to be unsuited to civil government.

Still less are we inclined to occupy our readers with speculations on the probable consequences of the revolution of the Greeks, on the future destinies of the remainder of European Turkey, or with any reflections on the policy of the leading powers of Europe, as it may be affected by the same event. One or two observations connected with the subject, however, we shall hazard, as the Greeks may, perhaps, do well to consider whether they do not furnish an argument for inducing them

* A Copy of the Constitution, accompanied by a Preface and translation, was published last year in London. 8vo. Murray.

to embrace the first reasonable offer of their late oppressors, and rather to insist upon terms of safety than extent of liberated country.

It may be observed that no great degree of power and opulence, or of prosperity in agriculture, commerce, or manufactures, can revisit Greece until its population is very greatly increased; that the Peloponnesus would not be so densely peopled as England, if all the Christians of Continental Greece speaking the Greek language were collected in it; that the Peloponnesus, the Cyclades, Eubœa, and Attica would form a state chiefly dependent upon naval defence for its safety, and consequently more easy both to establish and preserve than a larger portion of Greece with a more extensive land frontier; and that such a state, if governed with prudence, would infallibly have the effect of meliorating the condition of all the Greeks who might remain beyond those geographical limits, by affording them a refuge from oppression, or by obliging the Turks to treat them with justice and lenity in order to prevent their emigration. We have included Attica in this imaginary partition of Greece, not so much from the prejudice of ancient recollections, as from the immense importance of the

Megaris to the security of the Peloponnesus, and because Attica, which has an excellent frontier in Mount Parnes, cannot on the one side be separated from the Megaris and Eleutheris, nor on the other, as ancient history so clearly shews, from the island of Eubœa, and still less when the latter follows the fate of the Peloponnesus.* Nor would a treaty with the Porte for the entire liberation of the southern part of Greece prevent the mountaineers of Helicon, Parnassus, Cœta and Pindus, of Othrys, Pelion, Ossa and Olympus, or the inhabitants of some of the islands beyond the Cyclades, such as Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Rhodes, and Crete, from entering into a separate treaty with the Porte on an agreement somewhat different. It is obvious that, either from geographical position, or from their not having made so great a progress as the Peloponnesians in expelling the Mohammedans, these people may not have the same interests, nor be in a condition to treat with the Porte upon the same terms. It would seem that, in the first instance, to require an enlarge-

* In a state of these limits, it would be very necessary to include the important posts of *Mesolonghi*, Antirrhium and Naupactus, situated on the northern shore of the entrance of the gulf of Corinth.

ment of the bounds of independent Greece beyond the smallest extent of territory compatible with safety, or with the existence of a separate state, would at least produce delay in that which it is the interest of the Greeks to hasten by all possible means; for it can hardly be doubted that the independence of any part of the country would powerfully promote the immediate improvement and the ultimate liberation of the remainder; at the same time that it is, perhaps, in the present imperfect state of Greek civilization, an indispensable preliminary to the formation of a government capable of preserving order within, as well as the customary relations with foreign powers.

There are five classes among the Greeks into whose hands the direction of affairs must necessarily fall, as they alone are qualified for it by the education, or the power, or the influence, that are requisite. These are—1st, The military chiefs; 2dly, The primates, or men of landed or commercial property who possessed power under the Turkish government; 3dly, The higher clergy; 4thly, The persons engaged in maritime commerce, and particularly the leading men in the principal islands; 5thly, The foreign Greeks from Constantinople, or other parts of the Turkish empire,

who have joined the insurrection. We have arranged these classes according to their extent of influence in continental Greece, and unhappily at the same time in the inverse order of their degrees of civilization and fitness for conducting affairs. It has been shewn that the military chiefs, who have only been rendered superior to captains of banditti, by the late increase of their followers, and by the noble cause in which they are now engaged, have, by their unwillingness to submit to the suggestions of more enlightened men, been the chief impediment to the establishment of a central government. Several primates have contributed to the same pernicious result by continuing to exercise the avarice and meanness which was the inevitable habit of their lives under the Turkish government. Among the clergy a *few* may be found who are among the most enlightened, resolute, and patriotic of the nation; but it is chiefly upon the fourth class, upon the leading persons in the commercial and nautical communities of the more opulent islands, who have had long experience in the art of governing a free population, and who by their excellent management have contributed to convert barren rocks, too insignificant to be named in ancient history,

into populous and wealthy republics, that the friends of Greece would wish to see the task imposed of establishing and governing a Greek state—though without excluding some of the clergy, primates, and military chiefs, or the more essential services of the Byzantine or other Greeks who may be desirous of applying to the use of the new government the fruits of the education which they have wholly or partially received in civilized Europe.

And here we find an additional argument for confining the first formation of a Greek state to the islands and provinces which we have just indicated. As such a state would be principally maritime, its government would more naturally fall into the hands of that class which we have just observed to be the most fitted to conduct it. By avoiding an extensive land-frontier the Greeks would avoid in a great degree that collision with the Turks, or with the great powers bordering on Turkey to the north, which would greatly distract an infant government, and might retard the establishment of good order. The government would avoid also the necessity of deferring to the influence of the military chiefs of the mountainous districts, which form so large a portion of Greece

beyond the Isthmus, in the hands of whom the more exposed situation of that part of the country would require a larger share of authority to be placed, and who for a considerable time to come will probably strive to preserve their military power, whatever may be the condition of Southern Greece, or in whatever political position the Northern Greeks may stand towards the government of Constantinople, or towards the Mussulmans of Macedonia or Albania.

The sanguine and aspiring temperament, however, which has ever characterized the natives of this country, has already prompted the insurgents to look far beyond the Isthmus for the limits of their independence. Already they speak of including Thessaly within those limits, with the confident admission that they do not wish for a more distant boundary. But even in this case it may be observed by the way, that the northern frontier of the ancient Thessaly would form a very insecure boundary, unless it comprehended also the whole of Mount Olympus. The course of the river Haliacmon from the sea to its source in Mount Pindus, which would include a small part both of lower and upper Macedonia, would alone furnish a frontier, inclusive of Thessaly,

that would be consistent with safety. This line might terminate at Mount *Smólíka*, one of the great summits of the Pindus range, near the Vlakhiote town of *Samarína*, and might be prolonged from thence westward so as to include within the Greek boundary, *Kónitza*, *Delvináki*, and *Délvino*, terminating at the cape anciently called Onchimus, at the northern entrance of the channel of Corcyra. As this boundary would place some of the strongest passes of Western Greece within the Greek line, it would give a good frontier, where it is most wanted, on the side of Albania. The middle part of the frontier, having behind the Haliacmon the range of hills which connect Pindus with Olympus, and which cover the western parts of the plains of Thessaly, would present great defensive advantages as long as the Greeks could hold their ground in Mount Pindus. And the eastern part of the line is of immense strength. The only points of access from Macedonia into Thessaly, on that side, are the pass of *Servia*, which leads from the plains of the Haliacmon through the mountains anciently called Cambunii into the vallies of Perrhæbia, and from thence into the Pelasgiotis, or plain of Larissa—the still more difficult pass of Petra, which con-

ducts into the same vallies under the western side of the great summits of Olympus—and the succession of strong positions which lie to the eastward of the same summits, between them and the sea,* ending in the rocky and (in the face of an active enemy) the impenetrable defile of Tempe.

And here it may be remarked incidentally, that the line which we have just described is precisely the natural boundary of Modern Greece, if we determine its limits by language; for in Eastern Greece the Bulgarian is the prevalent tongue beyond the Haliacmon, as the Albanian is in Western Greece beyond the prolongation of the line of that river, which we have indicated. It is true that the Albanians have colonized to the southward of it in the part of Epirus opposite to *Corfú*, as far as *Suli* inclusive; but these are merely Albanian conquests, the language is of modern introduction, and the Greek is equally in use.

* It was in the strongest of these positions, in front of Dium and behind the river Enipeus, that Perseus resisted Æmilius Paullus, until Scipio Nasica, with a detachment of the Roman army, having gained possession of the pass of Petra, and having thus threatened the enemy's rear, Perseus retired in haste to Pydna, where the Romans defeated him, and in one day became masters of Macedonia.

If Thessaly should be excluded from independent Greece on its first establishment, the boundary line might follow up the Spercheius from its mouth in the Maliac gulf to its sources, and from thence nearly along the limits of the ancient *Ætolia to Makrinóro*, or the Amphilocheian pass, at the head of the Ambracic gulf. The Spercheius, with Mount Callidromus behind it, forms an admirable frontier; nothing indeed can be stronger, in a military point of view, than the whole mountainous isthmus included between the Ambracic and Maliac gulfs, with the strong passes of Amphilochia and Thermopylæ at the two extremities, especially if the defects created in the latter by the alluvions of the Spercheius were remedied by art; but as a frontier for a treaty of peace, the range of *Œta*, westward of the sources of the Spercheius, is so blended with that of Pindus, and the inhabitants of all those mountains are so much allied in manners and interests, that it would be very difficult to establish any precise boundary.

Within Mount *Œta* the only practicable line of frontier for independent Greece, and which, next to the Isthmus of Corinth, is the most marked in Greece, would be that which we have already had

occasion to mention, namely, the crest of the ridge of Cithæron and Parnes, which forms a distinct barrier from the Euboic frith to the gulf of Corinth, including within it Attica, together with the Eleutheris and Megaris.

Although a republic may not be the mode of government under which a successful insurrection most speedily settles into good order, as the example of Spanish America has sufficiently shewn, we must admit that it seems to be the most natural government for such a country as Greece; that as physical conformation and geographical position are the primary causes of the permanent form of the social system of every nation—thus giving a limited monarchy to the sea-girt England; a more military executive to the extensive land-frontier of France, and a federacy of republics to the mountains of Switzerland—so a social compact somewhat similar to that of the latter country, securing a central authority sufficient for maintaining the foreign relations of Greece, and for directing the national security, but leaving much to be executed by the local government of each island or province, appears to be that which would be the best adapted to the mountainous intersections, the commercial coasts,

the numerous islands of Greece, and to the great variety which those peculiarities have caused in climate, productions, manners, occupations and interests. The example of ancient history, and the very general feeling of the people, as shewn in their almost spontaneous assemblage from the several islands and districts in congress, seem to concur in indicating that Greece, if she succeeds in establishing her liberation, is destined to be a federative republic. But it cannot be concealed, at the same time, that this republican tendency causes the situation of the people at the present moment to be still more beset with difficulties than it would otherwise be, by rendering less easy that ability to maintain order which must precede the acknowledgment of their independence by civilized Europe; for it is to the same physical peculiarities of the country which have just been alluded to that we may trace the real origin of that *στασιώδεις* and *διχόνοια*, that spirit of faction and dissension, which characterized the ancient Greeks, and which has been conspicuous from the beginning of the present contest, preventing the exertions of the best men from having a full effect, suppressing all combination of useful measures, impeding the formation of a cen-

tral authority, and leaving success to depend upon the rude uncombined exertions of the national will.

But if the Greeks have shewn a want of union as great as that of their ancestors at the time of the Persian invasion, it cannot be denied that the difficulties of their situation are infinitely greater, and that while the contest in which they are engaged is still more truly an *ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών*, than when these words formed part of the song of the Greeks, as they advanced to battle at Salamis,* their previous condition has left them little hope of finding among themselves any of those great characters, which led their ancestors to victory and peace.

Nor, when they shall be relieved from external war, will the arduousness of the great attempt, upon which the people is now engaged, appear diminished on a comparative reference to the situation of ancient Greece. It will not be sufficient for them to form such a divided nation, as, when having successfully resisted in arms the most formidable power with which they were in contact, and mighty in their superiority to all other people in science and the arts, they could indulge in internal emulation, carried to the extreme of

* Æschyl. Pers. v. 405.

hostility. Compared to the rest of Europe, revived Greece will be what the least civilized of its ancient states was to the whole nation; and such a federative union as that of the Amphictyonic council cannot be tolerated in the great republic of modern Europe.

It has been thought impossible by some persons, that the present generation of Greeks, demoralized as they are by their long oriental servitude, should be able to govern themselves. We shall not be so rash as to hazard a prediction on this point: it may indeed be reasonably feared, that the effects of this degradation of character, repressed in a great measure at present by the general danger, will be even more conspicuous when the Greeks are independent. On the other hand, the necessity of an united government may go far towards creating it. A community of religion and a constant intercourse with the civilized world; the increased effect of Christianity, when no longer in chains, upon the national character; a church far from adverse to the promotion of useful knowledge among the people, and much less superstitious than could have been expected under its circumstances,—these advantages, in some of which the modern Greeks are so im-

mensely superior to their ancestors, can hardly fail to effect a rapid amelioration in their moral condition. Already some strong indications of improvement may be remarked in every class of the people. Among the more civilized who are now attempting to govern the nation, may be perceived an anxiety to merit the good opinion, as well as to profit by the advice, superior knowledge, and political experience of those who are more enlightened than themselves. Instead of those unreasonable expectations of an European crusade in their favour, which many of the Greeks at first entertained; instead of captious complaints and unbecoming remonstrances, arising from the want of a proper sense of their own situation, or from their ignorance of the history and international rights of others; further observation seems already to have convinced the more informed among them that they ought to be thankful for that neutral policy, which has left them to depend upon their own exertions, the only possible road to real independence. Among the ruder classes, to whose persevering efforts by sea and land the nation is indebted for its progress towards freedom, it would be unreasonable to expect that the traces of semi-barbarism should at once be obliterated.

As long as their contest continues with an enemy more barbarous than themselves, it cannot be doubted, that we shall occasionally hear complaints of inhumanity and anarchy. On the part of the great majority of their leaders, however, there is a strong desire to arrive at that state of discipline, both civil and military, which can alone correct those irregularities, and save the nation from the disgrace which continues to be not unfrequently inflicted upon it by the faults of individuals.

The further progress of the endeavours of the Greeks to complete their *ἀναγέννησις*, by entering into the great community of Christian nations, will be chiefly determined by their ability to correct that contentious spirit which is closely allied with their better qualities of industry, enterprize, and genius; and to establish such a state of order among themselves, as shall invite the friendly intercourse of civilized governments, and justify the acknowledgment of their independence. In the mean time they ought cautiously to avoid, in their conduct towards those powers with whom they come into contact, any of that insolence which success or ignorance, or a republican spirit are too apt to generate. It is no less important that they

should make every effort to suppress the disposition to piracy, to which the intricate coasts and rocky islands of Greece are naturally liable, and in which some of the more barbarous of the maritime districts often indulged during their subjection to Turkey. To compare this practice, which was marked only by cruelty and rapacity, and the lightest effect of which is a disregard to the maritime laws and customs of the civilized world, with the armed resistance of the mountainous parts of Greece during the long period of Turkish oppression, would be an insult to that which has in fact preserved the last remains of Grecian liberty, during the servitude of the nation. And as maritime irregularities are those which are more immediately liable to give offence to the foreign nations, with whom it is of the utmost moment that the Greeks should be on terms of amity, it should be their most urgent duty to eradicate this vice of the Grecian seas. Above all things they must keep the peace at sea, ἩΜΙΝ γὰρ θαλάσσια ἔργα μεμήησει.

LONDON, *August*, 1824.

THREE or four months have elapsed since the preceding pages were written; the latest intelligence from Greece has brought down the account of military transactions to the season beyond which the Turks are unable to prosecute active operations, and the result of the fourth campaign of the insurrection is ascertained.

By land the situation of the contending parties is not very different from what it was at the close of the first year; but the continuation of an insurrection implies victory to the insurgents, notwithstanding any partial misfortunes to which it may be liable.

In western Greece, we are not surprised to find, from causes which have already been explained, that the Albanian chieftains have made little or no exertions in the cause of the Porte, and that military operations have been almost suspended in that quarter. During the greater part of the summer Mavrokordáto had his head quarters at *Lygovitzi*, near the western bank of the Achelous, and Omer Vrioni at *Kervasará*, the ancient *Limnæa* at the south-eastern extremity of the Am-

bracic gulf. In eastern Greece, an attempt was made by the Seraskier Dervish Pasha to penetrate from the plains of Thessaly to the Corinthian gulf, by the route which leads from *Zituni* to *Salona* (Lamia to Amphissa), as an essential preliminary to the plan of campaign which has been described. By this movement he would at once have effected a junction with the Turkish ships in the gulf, and would thus communicate with the garrisons which are invested by the enemy by land at Patræ and Naupactus.

The shortness of the distance from the head of the Crissæan bay to the Maliac gulf, added to the facility of maritime intercourse, which the latter affords with Thessalonica and the Hellespont, renders the route from *Zituni* to *Salona* the most important passage in Greece next to the Isthmus. Its military strength is equal to its importance: and hence all the endeavours of the Turks to maintain the communication between the gulf of Corinth and Thessaly by this route have hitherto been frustrated. It traverses two of the most remarkable passes in Greece: of these the northern crosses a ridge which lies between the plain of the Spercheius and the Dorian valley, near the sources of the Cephissus, and connects mount

Callidromus with the great summits of *Æta*: the southern is a narrow defile separating Parnassus from the same mountains.

Of the former of these two passes, the danger was very much diminished to the Turks by their easy access into the valley of Doris, which, by its continuity with the lower valley of the Cephissus, and with the plains of Bœotia, extending to the barriers of the Isthmus, has generally been open to the Turkish troops. But the narrow rocky pass, which leads from *Gavriá*, the ancient Cytinium, into the celebrated plain, which extends from the heights of Amphissa and Delphi to the shore of the Crissæan bay, can never be traversed by them without the greatest danger, while the enemy remains in possession of the mountains on either side of it.

The Seraskier, however, by directing all his efforts to this point, succeeded, in the month of July last, in passing through the defiles; but at *Ampliáni*, about eight miles from *Sáloná*, he was attacked and defeated by the insurgents, and, after having suffered some further loss in his retreat, he resumed his positions in Doris and in Thessaly, without having effected the smallest advantage to the Ottoman cause.

In concert with this operation of the Seraskier, an attempt to recover Athens was at the same time made by Omér, a landed proprietor of Eubœa, who has been raised by the Porte to the Pashalic of *Égripo*, and entrusted with the conduct of the war on that side of Greece. He was met at Marathon in the middle of July by the Greeks under Goura, where he received such a check as, combined with the ill success of the Seraskier on the side of Locris, has been sufficient to confine his exertions to Bœotia. The latter made an attempt after his retreat from Doris to enter Bœotia to the support of Omér, but met with such opposition in the passes of Mount Cnemis, that he soon gave up the attempt, which was quickly followed by the retreat of the Turks in Bœotia behind the walls of Egripo.

The naval efforts of the Ottoman government have been of a much more formidable character, and the result has been proportionably more glorious to the Greeks, as they have had to oppose all the Musulman powers of the Mediterranean, whose united efforts, if we except the destruction of the two little islands of *Kaso* and *Psará*, have ended in complete failure.

Housref, the Capitan Pasha, after having landed

reinforcements in Eubœa, after having made a passing attempt to frighten the islands of *Skópelo* and *Skiútho* into submission, and taken on board a body of Albanians at Thessalonica, assembled at *Mytilini* his armament, amounting to about 150 sail. It is evident that nothing but a combination of the most determined valour, with the greatest prudence and good fortune, could enable so small a community as that of *Psará* to resist such an overwhelming force. These requisites were in several respects deficient. On the morning of the 3d July, a landing was made at the back of the island while the fleet fired on the town. The measure was completely successful; the Turks* quickly drove the enemy's out-posts before them, and made their appearance on the heights above the town, when the greater part of the Psarians retreated in confusion to their ships and put to sea, in which operation great numbers of them were lost. The town was then taken, and the greater part of the remaining population was massacred. The garrison of one of the fortified posts destroyed both themselves and the assail-

* A great part of these were Albanians. It was by a body of Musulman Albanians also that Casus was taken in the middle of June.

ants by setting fire to the powder magazine: the others capitulated. On the arrival of the Psarian refugees at Ydra, Miaoulis sailed to Psará, from whence the Turkish admiral had already withdrawn his armament, and where the Ydriotes found about 1000 Turks and about 20 ships in the harbour. The greater part of these they destroyed, and rescued a part of the ordnance belonging to the island, together with some Psarians who had concealed themselves in the hills. The Greeks then brought away the cannon left in the fortresses; the island has since that time remained desolate: and all its citizens, who have escaped slaughter or slavery, are, like the Athenians in the Persian war, indebted for a refuge to the hospitality of their countrymen in various parts of Greece.

The next operation of the Turkish Admiral, in the prosecution of his design of successively attacking the several strong holds of the insurgents in the islands, was an attempt upon Samos, for which a large body of Asiatic troops was collected at *Skalanova*, a town in the Ephesian district at the northern entrance of the strait which separates Samos from the Ionian coast. A part of this force, detached to the foot of mount Mycale, was

to be transported from Cape Trogilium to the opposite shore, where stood the ancient Samos, while another body from *Skalanóva* was to be debarked on the northern side of the island at *Vathy* and *Karlóvasi*. The Samians sent their families with provisions to the mountains, and remained in readiness to defend the passes, if the Turks should succeed in landing, while a division of the Greek fleet under George Sakhtúri of *Ydra* prepared to oppose the enemy in the straits.

On the 17th August, in a fourth attempt of the Turkish fleet to effect the passage of the strait, the same Kanáris of *Psará*, who had already burnt two Turkish line of battle ships, attached his fire-vessel to a 40-gun frigate under sail; the fire very speedily reaching the magazine, the greater part of those on board were destroyed, as well as several transports to which the fire communicated. At the same time other fireships burnt a Tunisine brig of war and a large Tripolitan corvette. On the 21st August the fleet of transports employed in carrying over the land forces to the north side of Samos were dispersed, and a part of them taken or destroyed. On the following day the Turkish fleet again attempted to effect the passage from Cape Trogilium, but such was now the

dread of the Greek fireships among the Turks, that the mere approach of two or three of them was sufficient to drive back the Ottoman men of war to the Asiatic coast. The troops, who were assembled on the shore of Mycale in readiness to embark, on witnessing this last disgrace of their navy, returned to the camp at *Skalanova*, and it was not long before the greater part of the land forces, which had been collected at that place, dispersed and retreated into the interior.

The Capitan Pasha, feeling the necessity of giving up the attempt upon Samos for the present, proceeded to effect a junction with the Egyptian expedition at Cos and Halicarnassus. Sakhtúri in like manner united his force with that of the chief navarch Miaoulis, at Patmos, after which the Greeks proceeded to observe the Musulman armament. On the 5th September a small division of Greek vessels with two fireships approached the Turkish fleet, when the latter got under weigh; the Greek fleet then joined their comrades, and an action taking place, the Turks lost some men, and two fireships of their opponents exploded without having done any damage to the enemy. The Greeks then retired to *Panormus*, (the port of the ancient *Branchidæ*, in

the district of Miletus) now called *Iéronda*. It was the object of the Capitan Pasha to return with the united fleet to Samos. On the 8th and 9th September the Turkish vessels attempted in vain to effect a passage through the channel between Calymna and the coast of Caria, the wind not being favourable, and the Greeks advancing to meet them. On the 10th they were still more unfortunate. Early in the morning they had advanced with a favourable breeze against the enemy, who was becalmed near Calymna; and the nearest of the Greek vessels, exposed to the heavy fire of the Turkish ships, were in danger of being destroyed, or at least of being cut off from the rest of the fleet, when a breeze arising, the Greek ships were enabled to act more in concert. Such a desultory combat, as the great inferiority of the Greek vessels will alone admit of, was kept up until the middle of the day, when two fireships were attached to a large Egyptian brig of war, and not long afterwards two others to the frigate which commanded the Tunisine division. So confounded were the Turks with the boldness and skill of their opponents in thus attacking them with their small vessels, in the open sea and under sail, that not even the Greek

ships accompanying the incendiary vessels suffered much from the Turkish fire. The Ottoman fleet returned in confusion to the anchorage near *Budrúm* (Halicarnassus), and the burning ships drifting ashore, were entirely consumed. Many of the seamen were drowned or slain in endeavouring to escape from the flames, but the Tunisine commander was taken, and remains a prisoner with the Greeks.

After this defeat the principal object of the Capitan Pasha seems to have been that of effecting a safe retreat to the Dardanelles. Some ships of war having been left for the protection of the transports which had been sent to the upper part of the gulf of Cos to land the Egyptian troops, the remainder, as soon as the calms, (which usually prevail for some weeks after the cessation of the Etesian winds) had given place to the equinoctial gales, took advantage of a southerly breeze, and after meeting with some interruption and loss near *Icaria*, reached *Mytilíni*.

On the 7th October, the Turkish admiral, having left Ibrahim Pasha in the command of the naval forces, re-entered the Dardanelles. About the middle of the same month, Ibrahim, after some unsuccessful encounters with the Greeks

near Chios and *Mytilini*, returned to the Egyptian armament in the gulf of Cos, and in the month of November his ships sustained considerable damage from the enemy on the northern coast of *Candia*.

If neither the Ottoman army in Thessaly can succour the fortresses at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth by land nor their navy by sea, as appears highly probable, those garrisons must be left to their own resources. We learn that Patrae is now invested with a large body of land forces, and that such a number of Greek vessels is stationed at the entrance of the gulf as has justified the government of the Ionian islands in issuing a proclamation enjoining all vessels bearing the insular flag to respect the blockade of the gulf. This proclamation was dated from Corfú, on the 17th November.

At no period of the contest have the prospects of the insurgents received such a rapid improvement as in the last six months. In the beginning of June, the persons forming the civil government were engaged in open hostility with their own military chieftains, who had shut them out from their capital and principal fortress of Nauplia. They had to prepare for the campaign with exhausted means; they had not yet received any

part of the loan which had been raised in London by their agents four months before; and they were in daily expectation of an attack from an armament composed of the combined forces of all the Musulman powers of the Mediterranean, the most formidable that had yet been collected against them.

It was under these desperate circumstances, that the executive, alarmed at their danger, and indignant at seeing among the transports hired at Constantinople and Alexandria, a great number of European flags, issued on the 8th June from *the Mills of Nauplia*, (the ancient Lerne,) an edict, authorising their cruizers to attack, burn, and sink, with their ships' companies, all the European vessels which they should find so employed.

We know by the experience of our own history, how difficult a question of international law is that of the extent of a belligerent's right to search, detain, or capture a neutral vessel; and the question is certainly not simplified by the circumstances of the present contest. No wonder then that men so unread and unpractised as the persons administering the government of Greece should have fallen into an error on this occasion. The tenor and tendency of the Greek orders, however,

had they been ever so right in principle, were too piratical to pass unnoticed. It was necessary to obviate the danger to which Maltese or other vessels under the British flag or protection might be exposed from the cruelty or thirst of plunder of any uncommissioned ruffian, who might take advantage of the Greek decree.

It seems to have been very reluctantly that the British government proceeded to adopt strong measures on this occasion, for it was not until the 6th of September, three months after the date of the Greek manifesto, that a proclamation was issued at *Corfú*, notifying that, in consequence of the refusal of the Greek government to annul the obnoxious decree, our admiral in the Mediterranean had been directed to seize and detain all armed vessels acknowledging the authority of the provisional government of Greece.

The Greek edict was rescinded by a new proclamation from Nauplia, according to which the Greek seamen were instructed that merchant ships under European flags, carrying stores and provisions without troops, had the privileges of neutrality, and were to be subject only to the usages existing under the same circumstances among European powers: which usages, it is to

be supposed, cannot protect them from the fortune of war, from capture, and even destruction, in case of their being found in company with and aiding a military operation of the enemy.

This new decree of the Greek government was speedily followed by another, requiring all Greek privateers to furnish themselves with commissions from the government; and thus amicably terminated the most serious of those inevitable collisions that has yet occurred between the delegated authorities of the Greek insurrection and the government of the western islands of Greece. The event will have been a lesson doubly useful to the Greeks, should it lead to the conviction that they are fortunate in having a neighbour who, from political necessity, is a vigilant observer of their conduct; who is qualified, by superior knowledge and experience, to give them the advice best calculated to keep them in the road of their true interests; and whose inclinations prompt him to bestow upon them all the assistance, compatible with the neutrality which is essential to the maintenance of the general peace of Europe.

LONDON, *January*, 1825.

THE close of 1824 arrived without the accomplishment of any of the great designs announced by the Porte in the beginning of that year. Of the forces enumerated in the plan of campaign which has been mentioned, the Egyptians had proceeded no farther than Crete, while the armies ordered for Northern Greece had either not been assembled at all or had dwindled into small bodies which had performed nothing of importance. By the experience of the three preceding summers there remained no hope to the Porte of making an impression upon the Moréa from the northward, without the simultaneous debarkation of a large and well appointed force on some part of the Peloponnesian coast; but the finances as well as the military ardour of the provinces of Europe and Asia were too much exhausted to render that easy in 1825 which had so thoroughly failed in 1822. As long, however, as any of the fortresses of the Moréa remained in possession of the Turks there was some prospect of success, and as the Pasha of Egypt entered cordially into the war, prompted apparently by a Musulman feeling, by the importance to him at all times of a good

understanding with the Porte, by the flourishing state of his treasury, and by the hope of at least of retaining to himself Crete and Cyprus; the Ottoman government was by his means furnished with an army for debarkation, to the providing of which their own resources were insufficient. They continued deaf, therefore, to any suggestions for entering into a compromise with the insurgents, they flattered themselves that the effort of 1825 would be decisive, and the assurance was carefully repeated in every part of Europe by the enemies of Greek independence.

It may be supposed that it was not without some hesitation that the Porte resolved upon thus tacitly giving up both *Candia* and the *Moréa* to the already too powerful Mehmet Aly; but it was the least of two evils; the chief pecuniary burthen of the war would be thrown upon him, the rest they left to Kismét or destiny—to those chances from treachery or accident, which have seldom allowed a troublesome provincial governor to die a natural death, and still less frequently to bequeath his authority to his family.

To those politicians who endeavour to persuade the Greeks that their views of independence are premature, it must be admitted that the insurrec-

tion has been so in one respect. It never before happened that Egypt had a Turkish Viceroy of such talent, ambition and good-fortune as to effect military conquest beyond the limits of his government, at the same time that he filled foreign harbours with his merchandize,—and who, though, like a true Turk, he has no other object than personal gratification through the misery of the great body of his subjects, is certainly a formidable power at the present moment.

By turning into his own coffers the greatest part of the land-revenue and of the commercial profits of Egypt, by improving the inexhaustible agricultural resources of that country, and particularly by his good fortune in raising a species of cotton, eagerly purchased for the manufactures of England,* he has created a revenue very far exceeding that of any of his predecessors, while his ambition has prompted him to expend those treasures in the increase of his military establishment, which now amounts to forty thou-

* Upwards of a million sterling is stated to have been paid for Egyptian cotton imported into England in one year; of this the Pasha monopolizes both the purchase from the grower, and the sale to the merchant. Thus it appears, that both the contending parties in Greece are now supporting the war with finances derived from England.

sand men, with a fleet of thirty vessels of war. That which the Greeks have been prevented from attaining, by disunion, by a want of government and by the constant pressure of immediate danger,—Mehmet Aly, having to consult only his single will, has in a very short time accomplished, namely, the formation of a body of infantry, instructed in the European use of the musket, and which, although their discipline is probably as yet imperfect, have at least acquired an advantage of great importance against the irregular troops of an anarchical people, that of obedience and the habit of acting as a single body.

Who could have foreseen even a year ago, that the Pasha of Egypt should so suddenly have increased his financial resources: or that his wealth should have attracted to his military service a great number of unemployed officers from France and other parts of Europe:* or that he should

* The influx of French officers into Egypt may lead to important consequences, unless Mehmet Aly should take the alarm, before the Europeans have made such a progress in organizing an army similar to that of the native troops of British India, as could not fail to give them great power and influence in the country. It is not intended to infer that the French government has any ambitious designs in encouraging

so quickly have mastered a difficulty which has hitherto been found insurmountable by any Turkish government, namely, that of bringing his army to submit to European discipline: or that he should so heartily have entered at an immense expense into designs, which with the most favourable result are more calculated to gratify a dangerous ambition than to serve his real interests. The event has totally changed the nature of the war in Greece, which before, although slowly, seemed to be surely leading to an independence *de facto*, which would have been the best preliminary to a pacification.*

this emigration; perhaps it has no other view at present than that of finding employment for a large portion of the needy survivors of the army of Bonaparte. But it is not difficult to conceive that circumstances may arise out of the proceeding, well calculated to suggest such designs. The *strictest virtue* cannot always resist temptation, and nations have been known by a dexterous management in peace, to regain what has been lost on the field of battle.

* In the same manner as Spanish American independence has been established without even the apprehension of any war with the power that lately ruled those countries. The Turks are a people seldom diverted from their purposes but by fear, and to move them the danger must be imminent; but it is equally in their character to submit when they are conscious that what is actually done cannot be reversed by any exertions of theirs, though it might be a most arduous task to obtain their previous concurrence in the same measure. Unhappily the

Unhappily for the Greek cause, the numerical strength of the Turks in Crete had, by the assistance of the Egyptians, produced a temporary suppression of the insurrection in that important island, which thus furnished Ibrahim Pasha, the son and lieutenant of Mehmet Aly, with great facilities of communication between Egypt and the Moréa, and thus enabled him to begin the campaign of 1825, without waiting for the return of spring.

In the middle of February, Ibrahim made a landing at *Mothóni* and *Koróni*; a second debarkation followed in the beginning of March, and before the end of that month, a battery had been erected against the small fortified town of *Neó-Kastro*, or *New Navarin*. This place, which had been taken by the Greeks in the first year of

present state of the war in Greece leaves but a distant prospect of pacifying the country in the manner alluded to; and there seems no other mode than that which is recommended by an eloquent writer who was not long since minister for foreign affairs in France. "Qu'on dise simplement à la cour Ottomane, (dans une dépêche collective, ou des dépêches simultanées adressées par les puissances chrétiennes au Divan,) Reconnoissez l'indépendance de la Grèce ou avec des conditions ou sans conditions; si vous ne voulez pas prendre ce parti, nous serons forcés nous-mêmes de reconnoître cette indépendance pour le bien de l'humanité en général, pour la paix de l'Europe en particulier, pour les intérêts du commerce."—*Chateaubriand, Note sur la Grèce.*

the war, instead of having been repaired and strengthened, instead of having conduced in their hands to the security of the harbour, one of the most important in Greece by its capacity, commodiousness and position ; instead of having led to the acquisition of *Mothóni* and *Koróni*, and to the safety of all the southern part of the Peninsula, had been left nearly in the same state in which it was taken from the Turks in 1821, consisting of a low wall without any ditch, flanked on the land-side by some small bastions, and still weaker towards the sea, where it had received only a slight patching, since it was battered by the Russians, from one of the opposite islands, in the year 1770.

The larger of these two islands, the celebrated scene of one of the few triumphs of Athens over Sparta, and destined once more to deserve the name of Sphaëteria, is two miles in length, and a quarter of a mile broad. It covers a noble basin of six miles in circumference, which has an entrance of six hundred yards between *Néó-Kastro* and the south eastern end of Sphacteria ; the northern end of the same island being separated, by a channel of one hundred yards, from a peninsular promontory anciently called Coryphasium.

A ruined castle* of the middle ages, which stands upon the summit of this Cape, on the site of the ancient Pylus, was occupied by the Greeks; the hill is steep and rocky, and a large lagoon on the land-side, separated from the sea at either end of the promontory by a narrow strip of land, renders the position naturally very strong. But the castle having neither been repaired nor armed, was incapable of defence against a very superior force; and being commanded, at the distance of one thousand yards, by the highest point of Sphacteria, there remained little hope to the Greeks of preserving either of their posts at *Navarin*, unless they could retain possession of the island by the assistance of their ships, eight or ten of which were anchored in the harbour.

The army of Ibrahim Pasha consisted of about ten thousand infantry, two thousand Albanians, and an adequate proportion of cavalry and artillery. After several desultory actions with small bodies of *Armatolí*, he attacked on the 19th of April, and completely defeated in their position, threatening the road from *Neó-Kastro* to *Mothóni*, all the troops which the President *Kundurioti* had

* The modern Greek name of this castle is 'Αεαπίνος,—whence the Italian names of *Old* and *New Navarin*.

been able to collect, amounting to about six thousand men. To take Sphacteria was the next object of Ibrahim, but it was not until the arrival of his ships from *Suda* in *Candia*, with a third division of land forces, that he found it convenient to put this design into execution.

On the 8th of May a landing was made from the fleet, at the same time that Ibrahim made a show of attacking *Old Navarin*. Sphacteria had been occupied by four or five hundred Greeks detached from the two fortresses, the remaining garrisons of which did not amount to more than two thousand men. At the moment of assault, all the Greek vessels, except one whose commander was in the island, made their escape out of the harbour, in order to join the squadron of Miaoulis, which had followed the Turkish fleet and was in sight in the offing. Receiving no farther assistance either from the fortresses or the Greek ships, the unfortunate defenders of the island were left to be cut to pieces by the very superior numbers who landed from the Turkish fleet. Mavrokordato and the commandant of *Neó-Kastro*, both of whom happened to be in the island, had the good fortune to save themselves on board the remaining ship, which fought its way with great gallantry

through the Turkish fleet; but its commander Psamado, one of the most distinguished Ydriote seamen, Count Santa Rosa, whose name is well known in the Piedmontese attempt at revolution, in 1820, and several Greeks who have acted a prominent part in the insurrection, fell in the island, together with the greater part of the troops. Two days afterwards the Greeks in *Old Navarin* capitulated on condition of laying down their arms and retiring; and the Turkish ships having entered the harbour, opened a fire upon *Neb-Kastro*. About fifty pieces of cannon were placed in battery on the land-side, but it was not until the 23d of May that, after a week consumed in negociation, the garrison marched out on the same terms as those of *Avarino*, and were embarked in European vessels for *Kalamata*. By the affair of the 8th they had been deprived of their commander, they had lost by the same disaster the provisions and stores which had not yet been landed from the Greek ships, and the aqueduct which supplied the place with water had been at an early period cut off by the Turks,—so that the transactions at Navarin, although not much calculated to adorn the Greek annals, serve at least to show that their disunion and unskilful-

ness are fully compensated by an equal want of skill and a greater want of activity on the part of the enemy. The Greeks had not suffered so severely on any occasion since the beginning of the war; more than two hundred fell in the actions near New Navarin, and a much greater number in the island, together with near one hundred of their invaluable seamen.

Ibrahim soon afterwards sustained a naval loss at *Mothóni*, which, although highly honourable to Greek enterprize, was not of sufficient magnitude materially to affect the operations of the Ottoman fleet. After the capture of Sphacteria, six ships of war and about thirty transports were followed by Miaoulis into the harbour of *Mothóni*, where more than half of them were destroyed by the Greek fire-ships.

When *Néb-Kastro* capitulated, the Moréa had already been abandoned by the Greek troops of Northern Greece, and was left to the defence of its native Armatolí. It was particularly upon the former brave men that the loss on the 19th April had fallen, and as they had heard of the arrival of Reshid Pasha as Seraskier in Epirus, and of his approach with a large force to *Mesolonghi*, it would have been impossible, under these

circumstances, for the Œtæan and Ætolian chiefs to keep their followers from proceeding to the defence of their own mountains, had they been ever so well inclined. These troops, it is to be observed, had entered the peninsula in the preceding autumn by the orders or rather at the persuasion of the government, which by their means had frustrated an attempt of Kolokotroni, in union with some of the leading primates of the Moréa, to change the executive power by force of arms. In consequence of the event of this conspiracy, Kolokotroni, at the time of the retreat of the Northern Armatolí from the Moréa, was a prisoner in Ydra; but, abandoned by the troops of Northern Greece, the executive body had no other resource than that of restoring the military power into the hands in which alone the Moreite troops had confidence. An amnesty was therefore published, and Kolokotroni, protesting all oblivion of the past, proceeded to collect the Armatolí of the peninsula, in order to oppose the advance of the Egyptians.

In the beginning of June a detachment of Ibrahim's army defeated a body of Greeks at *Aghiá*, on the mountain which overhangs the town of *Arkadhiá* (the ancient Cyparissus); and about the

same time the Pasha himself occupied *Kalamáta*, at the opposite extremity of Messenia, thus becoming master of all the resources of this fertile portion of the peninsula. From *Kalamáta* he soon began his march into the interior. After having sustained some loss from the troops of *Kolokotróni* in crossing the mountain now called *Makriplághi*, which separates the plain of Messene from the valley of Megalopolis or the Upper Alpheius, he occupied, on the 20th June, the abandoned and half-demolished Tripolitza, and hastening to profit by his advantages, appeared before Nauplia in one month after the capture of *Néb-Kastro*. A division of his army attacked the Greek outposts at the Mills of Nauplia on the 25th June, but without success; although the Greeks under Demetrius Ypsilanti (who had been living for the last two or three years retired from affairs at Tripolitza) had, in no part of the action, more than a few hundred men, supported by the fire of some small armed vessels anchored near the shore.

Having failed in his principal design, that of surprising Nauplia or of intimidating it into terms of capitulation, Ibrahim retreated from the Argolis, and endeavoured to attain the next most im-

portant object, that of opening a passage to *Patra*; but the mountainous districts of Arcadia and Achaia, which are interposed between that city and the plains of Mantinea and Argos, are exactly suited to such troops as the Armatoli of Greece; and though these were unable, as well from their numbers as their want of discipline, to face the Egyptians in a general action, or to interrupt the Pasha's communications with the Messenian ports, Ibrahim, on his part, has suffered considerable loss from sickness as well as from the sword, and has only been able to overrun the plains and to reduce all the most fertile parts of the country to that desolation which proverbially attends the footsteps of a Turkish soldier, even in peace. And thus was annihilated in a few weeks that slight improvement which had been produced by a three years' exemption from the blighting presence of the Musulmans, during which an increase of inhabitants seeking refuge from other parts of Greece, together with the confidence inspired by a government which, however imperfect, had been sufficiently composed of right materials to produce some beneficial reforms, promised in a short time to effect a favourable change in the whole peninsula. Schools of mutual

instruction and other places of education had been established in several towns, and no sooner had the government obtained the power of taking the collection of the revenue out of the hands of the old primates and captains of *Armatolí*, than the national domains formed of the confiscated Turkish property were let for double the sum that had been given for them in the preceding year.

In Northern Greece the war has been a repetition of that of the former campaigns with little variation. The same military plan (and in fact no other can well be devised) has produced similar movements, while the same defects in the Turkish system, without any abatement in the rude activity and courage which characterizes the Greeks, has led to similar failures.

About the same time that the Egyptian army occupied Messenia, the Osmanlys moved from Epirus and Thessaly upon the shores of the Corinthiac gulf: a Turkish division, making a rapid movement from *Zitúni*, seized upon *Sáloná*, and in the end of April the Seraskier Reshid Pasha appeared before *Mesolónghi*. But he came quite unprovided with heavy artillery; the Ottoman fortresses at the entrance of the gulf were unable to supply him to any great extent, and the

Greeks were successful in interrupting his communications with *Salona* and with Thessaly, through the mountains of Locris and Ætolia. Contracting his plan, therefore, the Seraskier recalled into Thessaly the troops which had entered Bœotia for the purpose of supporting the operations of the Pasha of *Egripo*, and reinforcing himself from Larissa, he directed all his means to the blockade of *Mesolonghi*, and to the protection of his position before that place, from the dangers with which it was continually threatened from the Ætolian mountains. The experience as well of the present as of the preceding year had shown him that no dependence could be placed on any of the Albanians, except the Gheghe or Roman Catholics of the province of *Scodra*, and he looked forward with anxiety to the arrival of the fleet of the Capitan Pasha, which was to bring him materials for the siege, to furnish boats for attacking the place on the side of the lagoon, and to secure his communication with *Patra* from the interruption to which it was liable whenever the Greek cruizers made their appearance.

The Turkish admiral sailed from the *Dardanelles* in the end of May; about the first of June

he was met in the channel of *Cavo Doro* (Capharea), by the Ydriote Sakhturi, who destroyed with his fire-ships three Turkish men of war and several transports; another corvette was run ashore by the crew and burnt in the island of *Syra*. These vessels contained a large proportion of the stores intended for the siege of Mesolonghi. A few days afterwards the Capitan Pasha entered *Suda*, where he joined the Egyptian fleet lately returned from *Navarino*. He was quickly followed by the joint forces of Miaouli and Sakhturi, amounting to about 70 sail. On the 14th, two days after their arrival, they attacked a division of the Ottoman fleet which remained in the outer harbour of *Suda*, and at the expense of three fire-ships, destroyed a corvette with its equipage. They were prevented from any further success, not so much by the strength or vigilant fears of the enemy, as by the narrowness of the entrance into the inner bay of *Suda*, and by the fortified island which protects it.

A few days afterwards the Greek fleet was dispersed by a tempest, when finding themselves deprived of their means of offence, by a deficiency of fire-ships, they retired to *Ydra*, leaving the Turkish admiral to proceed unmolested to Na-

varin, where he landed a reinforcement of 5000 men. From thence he pursued his course with seven frigates and many smaller vessels to Mesolonghi, where he arrived about the 10th July. The Turkish garrisons at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth then received the supplies of which they stood in need; the Seraskier pressed the siege of Mesolonghi with increased vigour, the boats of the Ottoman fleet entered the lagunes, and on the first of August the Turkish commanders, apprehensive of the approach of the Greek fleet, ordered a general attack. The works on the land side were assailed in four places, while thirty boats occupied the lake. The Osmanlys, however, were every where repulsed; and the Greek fleet, consisting of about 25 brigs, having quickly made its appearance, succeeded in destroying two small ships of war, as well as all the boats on the lagune,—in relieving Mesolonghi,—and in forcing the Turkish fleet to retreat, a part of it retiring behind the castles of the gulf of Corinth, while others made sail for the Ægæan, whither they were speedily followed by a detachment of the Greek vessels.

The Armatolí at the same time attacked the Ottoman camp and opened a momentary commu-

nication with the Greek garrison, but the Seraskier has been sufficiently strong to maintain his position without much interruption, and as late as the end of October he continued to besiege Mesolonghi, though with scarcely any result except that of loss to his own troops. It seems probable that the garrison, open as it is to relief by sea, will be able to sustain all such attempts until a great part of the Ottoman forces will assuredly on the approach of winter retire from their desolate and exposed situation, whether such a movement may be agreeable to their commander or not.

The Porte however appears to entertain hopes of pursuing operations through the winter. The Capitan Pasha from the Ægæan proceeded to Alexandria, where, in the middle of October, thirty ships of war with a fleet of transports, containing (it is said) eight thousand Egyptians, were ready to sail for the Moréa; it would seem therefore that the perseverance with which, according to the latest accounts, the Seraskier retained his position before *Mesolonghi*, had in view the assistance which he expected speedily to derive from this new Egyptian expedition.

It cannot be doubted that the unfortunate loss of *Navarin* has given the Turks a vast addition

of means for prosecuting naval operations on the western coast of Greece, and particularly in relation to the important positions at the entrance of the gulf of Corinth; but the present season is favourable to the garrison of Mesolonghi as well by sea as by land, and if the Greeks have only as much obstinacy as their enemies, that place ought not to capitulate until the Egyptians have effected the conquest of the northern part of the Moréa, or until the promiscuous rabble that man the Turkish ships have learnt to retain possession of the road of Mesolonghi in face of the Greek seamen. How far either of these suppositions may be realized in the ensuing year we shall not pretend to foresee.

Upon reviewing the events of the contest since its first commencement in the summer of 1821, it will be seen how little has been done on either side, in a military point of view, towards its decisive termination; such children are both parties in the art of war, and so contemptible will their operations both by land and water generally appear to the military critics of civilized Europe. But there are two advantages possessed by the Greeks which ought to prevent them from despairing of final success—the strength of their country and the superiority of their seamen. The skill, the

activity, and often the gallantry of the Greek sailors, have excited the approbation of some of our own sea-officers. It is true that neither the numbers nor size of their vessels are such as can give them the command of the sea, or ensure to them such a protracted blockade of the maritime fortresses as will lead to a surrender caused by famine, or prevent debarkations, such as those which have occurred during the present year, especially as long as the Greeks are unable to undertake a regular siege of the maritime fortresses. But the Turkish seamen always avoid the Greeks, and the Turkish squadrons are almost sure of receiving some damage whenever they meet. Their *brulotiers* in particular have furnished examples of enterprise and patriotic devotion, which are fully sufficient to establish the national character, and to cancel the disgrace of any conduct that may have occurred of an opposite kind, the unavoidable consequence of insubordination and of a privation of law both civil and military.*

* The skill and enterprise of the Greek seamen has not met with its merited success this summer. Had the bold attempt made in the month of August to burn the Ottoman armament in the port of Alexandria been successful, it would have greatly altered the present aspect of affairs.

In the strength of their mountainous districts the Greeks have a still firmer anchor for their hopes. The more exposed parts of Greece, such as Crete, Macedonia, and Eastern Thessaly, may enter into temporary terms with the enemy, but this cannot occur in that great citadel of mountains which extends from the plains of Thessaly and Bœotia, westward as far as the sea-coast, and southward as far as the centre of the Moréa—at least until the Ottomans are much farther advanced in conquest than they are at present. It might be supposed that military ignorance being nearly equal on both sides, the party which should first establish a disciplined force, and which should first obtain any important assistance from European officers of military experience, would be almost certain of success. But the discipline of the Egyptian infantry is not as yet, we apprehend, of a very high degree, and there is wanting in the Egyptian army the education, the intelligence, and those martial habits in every gradation of officers, without which the proficiency of the troops in the European use of the musket must lose a great part of its advantage. Mehmet Aly is yet far from having overcome those numerous vices in the Turkish

system, both civil and military, which so often render Turkish councils abortive. The desolation of the Moréa, together with the inefficacy of a Turkish commissariat, will place perpetual obstacles in the way of Ibrahim's progress, and will render the arduous task of subduing the mountains of Greece still more difficult. That tractability of disposition which has enabled Mehmet Aly to mould his Egyptians to the European discipline, is allied to an inferiority in hardihood and energy to the European and Asiatic Turks, with whom similar attempts have always failed. The Egyptians are precisely the troops least adapted to face the active and hardy Greek in the rude climate, the barren soil, and the strong positions of his native mountains. We cannot easily conceive that Greece is destined to be subjugated by Egyptians. Even Sesostriis drove his conquering chariot no farther than Thrace : nor will those who have had an opportunity of comparing the Greek with the Egyptian of the present day, think it probable that a conquest will now be effected, if it depends upon the military qualities of the two people. In short, as not even Spain in the time of the Romans was better adapted for prolonging an obstinate contest, by the strength of

the country and the elastic character of the inhabitants,* there is the fairest reason to hope that Mehmet Aly may be tired of his present expensive undertaking before he has made any great progress towards its completion—a result which is rendered still more probable if it be true that his commercial speculations with England are likely to be much less profitable in the present than they have been in the preceding year. If, with all the exertions of the Pasha of Egypt the Porte should now fail in becoming masters of the two great bulwarks of the insurrection—Mesolonghi and Nauplia, it may be said that they have put forth their utmost exertions in vain and that their future hopes will rest upon the effects of perseverance and of the superiority of their foreign assistance.

In addition to the two principal advantages which have been mentioned, the cause of the Greeks derives considerable strength and hope from the impossibility on their part of submitting to such a state of vassalage as they were before subject to. They know too well, that to give the Turks

* *Hispania non quam Italia modo sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat, locorum hominumque ingenii.* Liv. l. xxviii. c. xii.

such a power would be to consent to their own destruction: and they did not want the declaration of Ibrahim to be assured that if he should acquire the government of the Moréa by right of conquest, which the Porte has promised him, he would exchange the enslaved survivors of the peninsula for a colony of Egyptians. Such a termination, however, all history as well as common reason tell us is impossible if the Greeks have but "the unconquerable will and courage never to submit and yield." The utmost that can be expected is the retreat of a great part of the population of Greece into the mountains, a continuance of predatory warfare on both sides, and the desolation of every other part of the country, except perhaps the immediate vicinity of the fortified places. Some politicians will perhaps be inclined to say that, however deplorable to the people of Greece such a result might be, it would be better that they should suffer than that the general peace of Europe should be compromised. But supposing the interior continent of Greece to be thus comfortably settled for the general repose, there still remains an extensive sea-coast—in fact the numerous islands, the winding shores, and the great proportion of maritime outline to the size of

the country, render the Greeks more peculiarly a naval people than any other in Europe. If forced to the extremity of distress they must be pirates by sea as well as freebooters by land. However disposed the nation might be to a better course, however deserving of a better fate, necessity would force the maritime population to those habits of life, which are natural to Greece in a savage state, and to which its rocky creeks and islands have always afforded and will ever give the greatest facilities. No alternative would then remain for the powers of Europe, but to give up all commercial pursuits in the Levant or to suppress the Greek piracies by force—in other words, to assist the Turks in exterminating them from their native islands.

It cannot be doubted that the Porte with its proverbially slow and persevering policy looks forward to this ultimate result; to the gradual effects of distress in rendering the insurgents utterly lawless, until with loss of character they shall lose the sympathy which is now excited in their favour, and shall not have a partizan in Europe sturdy enough to espouse their cause. They may then, it is hoped, by the agency of menace, fraud or bribery upon leading individuals or separate com-

munities, be induced in detail to offer submission and to accept the amnesty of the Porte. Similar views seem to be entertained by those *civilized* opponents of the emancipation of Greece in the courts of Europe, who have imitated the Porte in incessantly predicting the complete defeat of the insurgents in *another* campaign.

On the other hand the longer this contest lasts, the more incredible it becomes, that Christian Europe will contemplate unmoved the destruction of a Christian people by the semi-barbarous followers of a religion hostile to the whole Christian name, because those infidels have for some centuries been suffered to abuse the possession of some of the finest countries in Europe, and because, in consideration of their proximity and for the sake of the general peace, they have in some degree been admitted into the social system of the civilized world. In a case of extremity it is difficult to conceive any other result than that the great powers should agree in procuring a pacification, or that their disagreement upon the subject should lead to a war.

It is reported that one of these powers is desirous of seeing the Greeks reduced as nearly as possible to their former state of vassalage; that another

wishes the whole country to be formed into three principalities after the fashion of Moldavia and Wallachia; while it seems to be the desire of the nations which do not border on the Turkish empire, and which come into contact with the Greeks only by sea, that some part at least of the country should form an independent state. To Great Britain in particular such a consummation is particularly desirable. The principal reasons are too obvious to require mentioning: it is sufficient to allude to the nautical and commercial character of the Greek people, to the necessity of maintaining our high station in the Mediterranean against powerful rivals more conveniently situated, and whom to suspect of having designs both upon Greece and Egypt will always be a salutary presumption—to the positions which, with a prospective policy of this kind, we have now for fifteen years held in Greece itself.

In attempting to devise an arrangement for the pacification of Greece, the following considerations, some of which have already been adverted to in a preceding part of this memoir, seem to be the most important.

1. That in every part of the Turkish empire, but especially in Europe and in the maritime parts

of Asia, the superior intelligence and industry of the Greeks have rendered the Turks greatly dependent upon them in the transaction of affairs, political as well as commercial and domestic, and that hence arises a permanent bond of connexion between the two people on the basis of reciprocal advantage which would promote tranquillity, if the Greeks had that security against Turkish extortion and religious intolerance which can only be completely afforded by a place of refuge among their own countrymen.

2. That the chief obstacles (independently of the existing war) to the internal tranquillization of Greece and to the formation of a stable government is the very uncivilized nature of its military population added to the contiguity of Albania, where a large portion of a still more uncivilized people is under the necessity of finding employment as soldiers.

3. That an extensive land frontier to liberated Greece would render much more sensible the influence of the soldiery both of Greece and Albania, at the same time that all the foreign relations of an infant government would become more difficult and complicated.

4. That the agricultural and commercial capa-

bilities of the Moréa are so great, that it would not be too densely peopled with ten times its present population.

5. That a modified principle of actual possession appears to be the only basis of pacification practicable under *existing circumstances*: in other words, that however disposed European mediators may be to favour the Christian party, the Turks cannot be required to give up much more than they have lost, nor the Greeks be supported in demanding much more than they have really gained by the war—the chief object of any interference of the powers of Europe in this question, being the future security of this Christian people from the cruel oppression under which they have so long been suffering.

With these main considerations in view, the following appears to be the most practicable plan for the benefit of Greece at the present moment.

1. The Peloponnesus, together with all the European islands except Crete, to form an independent state under the system of government which has already been in part established, but subject to such improvements as experience may have shewn desirable.

It has already been remarked that the physical

construction of the country, and the evidence of ancient history, as well as the national feeling and opinion, so strongly shewn by the meeting of deputies from various parts of Greece in the years 1822 and 1823, all equally tend to prove that a central representation of the islands and districts, with a municipal government to each of them, is the most natural constitution of government for Greece, and such we are persuaded it will always in great measure be, whatever may be the form of the central executive administration.

It has been strongly argued against rendering any part of Greece independent, that the people are as yet unfit for such a task—that they are at present incapable of governing themselves. But the same was long said of the Spanish American States, which we now find gradually settling into governments that may be treated with. If Greece emerges from an infinitely more degrading servitude than that of Spanish America, there are many Greeks on the other hand who have profited by that advantage which their country possesses over America, in its vicinity to the most civilized part of the world—an advantage which would be attended with the most rapid effects, if Greece were restored to freedom.

Without denying that the Greeks inherit the contentious character of their ancestors, it may be argued in their favour that their failure in forming a government was the inevitable consequence of their previous condition and would have happened to any other people formed of similar elements. When it is considered that the military defence of the country by land has, from the beginning of the insurrection, been in the hands of an irregular soldiery, who, although they possess some great virtues and deserve highly of their country, are the most unenlightened class in the nation, and that the leaders of this militia are in general persuaded that their interests are opposed to the formation of a civil government, it is not surprising that such circumstances, added to the constant imminence of external danger, should have paralyzed all the efforts of men who for the most part were uneducated, who had been excluded from intercourse with enlightened society, and who were totally unpractised in the management of great affairs. We cannot be surprised that discord, which misfortune seldom fails to generate, should have arisen amongst these men themselves, or that whenever the difficulties which assailed them drove the better class from power, its seat should

have been occupied by selfishness, avarice and incapacity. Such a cruel war as the Greeks have been exposed to, has unsettled many a government that had been established for ages; no wonder then, that it has prevented the formation of a system of order where none previously existed. So far from thinking that Greece possesses no men adapted to the conduct of affairs, we believe that there is scarcely any people among whom the natural qualifications for such stations are more common, though it will probably require some years of peace and freedom to produce their complete development. Every failure of the Greeks in government may be considered a lesson for the future and an approximation to a better management; for that such is the natural progress of society, Spanish America, among many other examples, has shewn and still continues to prove to us. If, upon further trial, the Greeks should still be found too unenlightened and contentious to establish order—if no man should arise among them capable of supporting the central Executive authority, (for this seems to be the great deficiency,) they may themselves see the necessity of resorting to foreign assistance.

2. With respect to Greece beyond the Isthmus,

the difficulty of attaining tranquillity under a mixed government of Greeks and Turks is, perhaps, not so great as at first sight may appear. In fact, there has existed a system of this kind in many parts of Greece ever since the Turkish conquest. The Greeks never having been completely subdued, it has followed, that in those parts of the country where the Turks could not indulge their savage disposition without danger, a compromise of power has generally been the practical result. In the parts of Greece most exposed to Turkish oppression, no such middle state could exist; but wherever it met with a check, either from the strength of the country, from the especial protection given by the Porte to a favoured district, or from some more temporary and accidental cause,—where the fear of the Turkish power was sufficiently strong at the same time to repress the jealous character of the Greeks, they have enjoyed a considerable share of order and tranquillity under a municipal administration. It was especially in those places where some prosperous branch of trade or art afforded a lucrative employment to the Greek community, at the same time that the situation of the place gave them security, that these little republics were most

orderly: a βουλή of elders, precisely in the manner of the ancient Greek states, formed the governing power, which was supported by a stipendiary guard of Albanians or Armatolí. There were several flourishing communities of this description both in Northern Greece and the Moréa, the destruction or decline of which is to be dated, in the former division of the country to the increase of Aly Pasha's power, in the latter to the unfortunate expedition undertaken by Russia in the year 1770, which exposed the Peninsula to the alternate plunder of the Osmanlys and Albanians, and greatly reduced its population. The islands of the Ægæan Sea in like manner, though occasionally exposed to cruelty and insult from the Turkish fleet, or from pirates, were tolerably tranquil under Greek municipalities: and thus also, *Parga*, *Prévysa*, and *Vónitza*, for some years after the treaty of 1800, were happily administered under Venetian laws with an Aga residing on the part of the Porte.

If such a mode of government were established by the mediation of some of the European powers, and if the security of the Greeks were placed under their guarantee and the protection of their agents, it would probably not be long before

Greece, exclusively of the Moréa and the European islands, would be enabled, without any difficulty, to supply a revenue to the Sultan greater than he formerly derived from the whole country. The Albanian and Greek soldiers, being employed in considerable numbers, and regularly paid by the provincial or local governments, would thus be prevented from troubling the public tranquillity, while the Greek population, attending in security to agriculture, commerce, and education, would be following the surest road to a further improvement in their political condition.

Northern Greece might be divided into three governments, of which the chief places would be *Arta*, Larissa, and *Egripo*; Eubœa, according to this mode of pacification, being attached to the continent, and not considered one of the islands. Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, Cos, Samos, Chios, Lesbos, Lemnos, might each constitute a separate government, tributary to the Porte, but secured from any interference of the Turks. In Crete, in the plains of Thessaly, and in the parts of Bœotia and Eubœa around *Egripo*, where Turkish individuals possess a considerable quantity of landed property, they might claim some share in the civil government; but the general effect of

the new system would probably be, that many of them would dispose of their lands to the Greeks, and that they would gradually withdraw into Asia, or towards Constantinople.

In proposing the independence of the Moréa as the basis of the pacification of Greece, the writer does not wish to disguise, either from himself or his reader, that he has thought more of the interests of Greece and of Great Britain than of what may be agreeable to some of the other powers of Europe. At the same time he cannot avoid entertaining the opinion, that this is the only plan which promises to save the Turkish empire from destruction and Europe from a general war.

We have already observed that there are two other modes of disposing of this great question—to reduce Greece to its former condition, or to partition it into principalities under governors taken from the Greek families of Constantinople.

In reference to the former, it must be admitted that there is no tranquillity so profound as that of solitude and desolation—that it is by the operation of a principle somewhat similar that the Turkish empire has so long opposed a barrier to the conflicts of European avarice or ambition, on that fine field which is situated on the eastern

side of the Mediterranean—and that it may be said, that if the Greeks chuse to submit their necks to the Turkish sabre, the nations of Christian Europe have no right to object to this mode of keeping the peace. But enough has been stated in the preceding pages to shew that such a result has now become scarcely possible. It may be a better mode of occupying the reader's time, therefore, to add a few words on the plan of forming Greece into principalities.*

It cannot be perceived that the advancement in knowledge, which has taken place among the Greeks during the last half century, has been, in

* The reader will find, in the *documents* appended to the Annual Register of 1825, a translation of the semi-official Russian paper which contains this latter plan, together with a remonstrance of M. Rodiqs, secretary of the Greek Executive, addressed to the British government, and Mr. Canning's reply. According to this plan, one principality was to consist of Eastern Greece, or of Thessaly, Bœotia and Attica; a second of Western Greece, or of Epirus, and Acarnania, from the Austrian boundary northward to the gulf of Corinth; the third of the Morea and Candia: the other islands to remain under a municipal government nearly in their former state. It may be thought, perhaps, that this plan differs little from that which we have suggested for Greece beyond the Isthmus; but the entire independence of a part of the country together with the latter, as an arrangement, rather intended to be provisional than permanent, makes a very wide difference in the two propositions.

any degree, the consequence of the connexion with the Turkish subjects of the Greek church, which Russia acquired in the years 1774, 1779, and 1802; unless it be inasmuch as the Russian flag was for some years very useful to the Greek seamen in the islands; still less can that amelioration be attributed to the power which has been delegated by the Porte to a small number of Greeks during the last century. In short, there seems little doubt that the formation of Greece into governments, like those of the Ultra-Danubian provinces, would be almost as unfavourable as its former state to that further moral improvement which must precede the complete admission of the Greeks among the civilized people of Europe. Is it that the proposers of this method of pacifying the country are fearful of the example of Greek freedom upon their brethren of the same church in the Russian dominions? is it that hence they are desirous that the Greek character should not lose the defects which it has acquired under the Turkish yoke, and that the Greek, in every gradation of office, should still closely resemble the Turk similarly situated?

But it is chiefly as tending to increase a power already too formidable, as adding further strength

to the monarch who has declared the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Finland indissolubly united to the Russian empire, as enabling him to stretch his giant arms around Constantinople on the west, as he has already done towards the frontiers of Persia on the east, that the plan alluded to is most objectionable.

It has for many years been the general opinion, that a hostile attack from Russia with all its strength would be immediately fatal to the Turkish empire in Europe. The Porte, however, has been sufficiently confident in the impediments to such an undertaking, never to lower its tone towards the court of St. Petersburg to the degree which a contrary conviction would naturally have produced, always trusting that such an attempt would meet with great opposition from other governments, and would probably give Turkey several powerful allies. The difficulties, in fact, are not trifling. As it would be impossible to supply a large army in such an impoverished country as Turkey, without the assistance of a numerous fleet in the Black Sea, the preparation of which would require much time and expense; and as every Turk is armed and would be an obstinate defender of his own walls,

such a delay would be created, and such an immense Ottoman force would be collected around Constantinople, that a Russian army would be placed in the most imminent danger from Austria, in the rear, unless the operation had been previously combined with the latter power upon an understanding of mutual aggrandizement.

A gradual encroachment preparatory to ulterior conquest is the plan, therefore, that leads most surely to success. The relative position of Russia and Turkey would be very different from that which has prevailed for the last half century, if Greece had been previously for some time divided into principalities under Russian guarantee and inspection. Its governors and other persons in authority would then be little more than Russian agents, and during a preceding state of peace such a preparation might be made for a diversion to the southward, on any sudden assumption of hostilities, as would leave the Porte little chance of resistance on the northern side of the Bosphorus.

It would seem, therefore, that the Ottoman government should above all things be averse to the plan for governing Greece to which we have just alluded, and that it ought not to be indisposed

to a friendly arrangement with the insurgents on the basis of a partial independence, by which measure alone it can hope in future to derive any useful assistance in war from the Greek seamen, whose loss it already severely feels. But the obstinacy of pride and ignorance, aided, perhaps, by the advice of some Europeans, trembling at the further dispensation of free principles, blinds the Porte to its real interests, and leads it to believe, that Greece may still be reduced to its former state of bondage.

LONDON, *December*, 1825.

NOTE

TO PAGE 5, LINE 13.

IN adverting to the Histories or Memoirs of the Greek Insurrection which have been compiled in Europe, it is impossible to avoid some more particular notice of one of them, which, having been written by a person long resident in Greece, and who, while composing his work, was in correspondence with a brother remaining in that country, may be considered, from these circumstances, as entitled to the public confidence. The work to which we allude is the "Histoire de la Régénération de la Grèce," by M. Pouqueville. It consists of four volumes, in octavo, and includes the modern history of Greece, from the year 1740 to the end of 1823.

The author, as many of our readers may know, has already published two books of travels in Greece. The first, called "Voyage en Morée," appeared in the year 1805, in three volumes, octavo, and consisted of such very imperfect information as the author could collect during a close imprisonment at Tripolitza, and at Constantinople, added to that, which some of his comrades in captivity obtained under similar circumstances at Ioannina. The second work, intituled, "Voyage dans la Grèce," is in five thick and closely printed octavos, and contains the result of the author's observations during a residence of eleven years in Greece, in the capacity of consul-general of France.

One of the author's principal objects in these two

works (as it must be of all travellers in Greece) was an illustration of the ancient geographers and historians by means of topographical researches. So well satisfied is he with the result of his labours, that he congratulates himself in the Preface to the "*Voyage dans la Grèce*," on having at length "*débrouillé le cahos, qui couvrait l'antique Hellade*." It appears, however, from M. Pouqueville's Narrative, that he travelled very little in any part of Northern Greece beyond the limits of Epirus; it is not surprising, therefore, that his attempts to describe districts which he never saw, and to accommodate mere oral information to the ancient authorities, have often produced erroneous results. Even in Epirus, which he had such ample means of exploring during a ten years' residence at Ioannina, his conclusions are scarcely less defective than in the provinces which he had not personally examined. Embarrassed where to place Dodona, he spreads the honours of the site over a space of twenty-five miles; he mistakes the ruins of Charadrus for those of Ambracia, and the river Arachus for the Inachus, errors of such radical importance that they involve in absurdity the ancient geography of all the adjacent country.

In the Peloponnesus M. Pouqueville could not so easily go astray, that country being better known than Northern Greece; but having traversed only a few of the principal routes, he has added very little to the geographical information on the peninsula which the public already possessed.

The incorrectness with which M. Pouqueville writes the modern Greek names is by no means an unimportant defect in a work that aspires to be a guide to the geo-

graphy of Greece. Sometimes he *Gallicizes* the names, as "Loroux, Dremichoux," for Λοῦρος, Τραμετζοῦς, "les monts Olichiniens," "les Haliacmonts," for the mountains called Ὀλύτζικα, Λιάκα, and often they are purposely distorted to support some favourite paradox, as in the instances of Iapouria, or Iapygia, Aidonia, Toxides, Caulonias, instead of Liaberí, Aidonát (the Turkish corruption of Saint Donatus), Toshke, Kolonia, which are the real modern names. The poverty of his acquisitions in Grecian geography is shown at once by the diminutive scale of his map, a single glance at which will equally prove its inaccuracy to every person acquainted with the country—Ioannina, the place of his long residence, instead of being nearly midway, as he places it, between the eastern and western coasts, is in truth only 32 geographical miles in direct distance from the nearest shore of Epirus, or between one third and one fourth part of the breadth of Northern Greece.

We have found it impossible to avoid these observations on M. Pouqueville's geography of Greece, because it has been necessary to enter briefly into the same subject in the present Memoir.

As to the "Histoire de la Régénération," we find it written in the same romantic and poetical style which prevails in the author's Travels, and which, although often very agreeably applied by him to local description and the representation of manners, is not so well suited to a statement of facts. Instead of a plain narrative, the author has entered into the supposed causes, combinations, and consequences of each trifling event; relating, as if he had been present, the speeches that were spoken, as well as the actions

that were performed, thus losing the confidence of his reader by an attempt at precision, which it was impossible for him, under the given circumstances, to attain. Nor is M. Pouqueville satisfied with displaying his knowledge of each thought and movement of the contending parties; he is equally competent to expose the Machiavelic arts, as he is pleased to describe them, of the agents of Great Britain; and he pretends to be thoroughly instructed in every secret council of the British Septinsular government, which he politely entitles the Pandemonium of Corcyra. In fact, it appears to have been his main design, as a true disciple of the Napoleon school, to throw blame and odium upon England and Englishmen: but we may console ourselves with the assurance that his authority will neither be very extensive nor very durable.

 ERRATUM.

Page 113, line 9, *for* "a mile broad,"
read "two miles broad."

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